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Cyborg ontology and politics in intelligent nation Singapore 
  
With its history inextricably linked with technology since independence, Singapore makes 
an excellent study of the cyborg phenomenon. The cyborg, which describes a cybernetic 
organism that is a hybrid of machine and organism, originally referred to an enhanced 
human being who could survive in extreme environments. Transforming Singapore into 
an intelligent nation has become a nationalist project as well as a personal responsibility 
for its people. While ICT policies promote the inevitable cyborgian path for Singapore’s 
future, there are concerns and issues that could be unravelling their intended outcomes. 
The ‘Intelligent Nation 2015’ master plan, or iN2015, Singapore’s latest ICT policy, 
markets the promise of empowerment in a digital future for everyone; a rhetoric clearly 
shifting from one of survival and crisis management to that of technotopia. The thesis 
argues that cyborgisation under iN2015 is driven by the technologically possible and 
desirable with consequences that are contradictory to its aspirations of a digital future that 
is empowering for all. Employing Donna Haraway’s “A Cyborg Manifesto”, the thesis 
hopes to uncover the ontology and politics of new technology adopted by iN2015 that is 
speeding up the cyborgisation process in intelligent nation Singapore.  
 
Haraway’s cyborg is both oppositional and utopian; it holds promises and hopes, as well 
as dangers and threats. While iN2015 sees the cyborg as a technologically enhanced state 
that is desirable, Haraway’s cyborg in contrast provides a platform for examining the 
productive tensions and possibilities between the technological and the organic in our 
relationship to new technology. Paul Virilio’s chronopolitics drawn from his study of 
speed in history called dromology will be discussed for its relevance on how speed has 
become the main driver of technological innovation and a source of capital and power. 
Gillian Youngs’ political economy approach has also been enlisted to provide an insight 
into areas affected by new technology, particularly, on power and inequality.  
 
The iN2015 vision will be closely examined to uncover what cyborg body/bodies are 
being produced in intelligent nation Singapore, and how they relate to social reality 
defined as lived social relations. The cyborg future in 2015 necessitates a form of 
technological citizenship that obliges citizens to be technologically knowledgeable to the 
extent of being mainly media savvy users and consumers of new technology. The iN2015 
cyborg ends up being one-dimensional, its promise of empowerment driven mainly by 
consumption, while living a life in technicity addicted to speed, constant innovation, and 
the hyperreal. Finally, if new technology is more fraught with the politics of growing 
inequalities, how can we employ the cyborg itself to rethink a different ontology and 
politics in dealing with new technology? These are all urgent questions for our 
contemporary times mediated by new technology and will be discussed closely in relation 
to the iN2015 master plan. 
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Table 1: Measurement of Household Income Disparity 
Year 1990 1995 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Gini Coefficient 0.436 0.443 0.444 0.446 0.467 0.481 
Ratio of Ave Income       
Top 10% to lowest 10% 26.1 - - - - 275.5 
Top 20% to lowest 20% 11.4 13.8 13.6 14.6 17.9 20.9 
9th decile to 2nd decile 5.5 6.1 5.9 6.2 6.8 7.4 
Income shares       
Lowest 20% 4.2 3.5 3.6 3.3 2.8 2.4 
Middle 60% 47.6 48.5 48.3 48.5 47.4 46.6 
Top 20% 48.1 48.0 48.2 48.2 49.8 51.0 
 
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
A 0.444 0.456 0.457 0.460 0.464 0.470 0.476 0.489 0.481 
B 0.431 0.434 0.433 0.449 0.454 0.459 0.455 0.479 0.462 
Ratio of Ave 
Income  
         
Top 20% to 
Lowest 20% 10.1 11.1 11.3 11.5 11.7 12.3 12.4 13.2 13.0 
A is Gini coefficient based on Original Income from Work per Household Member 
B is Gini coefficient based on Household Income from Work per Household Member after 
accounting for Government Benefits and Taxes 
 
 
Table 2: Gini Coefficient Among Employed Households/Ratio of Ave Income 
 





























  Introduction 
  Singapore the cyborg state: concerns and issues 
  
 With its history inextricably linked with technology since independence in 1965, 
Singapore makes an excellent study of the cyborg phenomenon. A cyborg, an 
abbreviation of cybernetic organism, refers to a technologically enhanced human being 
who could survive in extreme environments. The thesis proposes that the cyborg 
description appropriately summarises Singapore’s technologically enhanced state. A mere 
red dot of an island without natural resources and not even self-sufficient in water, 
Singapore has had to turn to wastewater (sewage) and desalination as new sources of 
water. Sitting in a sea surrounded by what the state often alludes to as unpredictable 
neighbours, Singapore has built up the most sophisticated military hardware in the region 
while conscription is mandatory for all male citizens. Finally, technology has always been 
Singapore’s lynchpin for economic survival. Alwyn Lim observes that “to write a history 
of the development of Singapore is to also to write a history of technology in Singapore” 
(“The Culture of Technology of Singapore” 42). Singapore has been marshalling its 
cyborg existence with five national information technology (IT) plans in the last three 
decades of its 44-year history; the latest being the 10-year master plan adopted in June 
2006 called Intelligent Nation 2015 (abbreviated as iN2105). While the cyborgian path 
seems inevitable, even essential, for Singapore, there are concerns and issues relating to 
Singapore as a cyborg state and its cyborgisation process that could be unravelling their 
intended outcomes. The thesis argues that cyborgisation under iN2015 is driven mainly 
by the technologically possible and desirable, with consequences that are contradictory to 
its aspirations of a digital future that is empowering for all. The thesis also asserts that 
iN2015 produces cyborgs as one-dimensional, which is essentially consumptive, while 
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living a life in technicity, described as a hypermodern techno lifestyle, one that is 
addicted to speed, innovation and the hyperreal. Before the thesis deals with these 
concerns and issues of Singapore’s cyborgisation under iN2015, the term, cyborg, needs 
to be clarified for three reasons: one, to contextualise its meaning in relation to 
technology and tools that have marked human history; two, to explain why it has been 
mobilised to deal with Singapore’s tryst with technology; and three, how the term and its 
associated words will be used in the thesis.  
 
1  Have we not always been cyborgs? 
 The term, cyborg, has been mainly attributed to Manfred Clynes and Nathan Kline 
who used it in 1960 in their space travel research to modify the human body so that it can 
adapt and survive in extraterrestrial environments (29-33). During this Cold War period 
of space exploration, the United States was anxiously competing with the Soviet Union, 
especially after the Russians, ahead of America, launched the Sputnik, a satellite in outer 
space. Clynes, a scientist and musician, and Kline, a psychiatrist, were invited by the US 
Air Force School of Aviation Medicine to present a paper on ways to surmount the 
biological problems in space travel at the Psycho-physiological Aspects of Space Flight 
Symposium. In their paper, “Cyborgs and Space”, the cyborg would be an “exogenously 
extended organizational complex functioning as an integrated homeostatic system 
unconsciously” (30). To understand this original meaning of cyborg, it helps to 
understand another term cybernetics, from which the first syllable forms part of its word. 
Cybernetics1 is a study of the structure of the regulatory systems (digital, mechanical or 
biological) that process information, react to information, and change or can be changed, 
                                                
1 Norbert Wiener defined cybernetics in his book of the same title as the study of control and 




to better achieve their tasks. It stems from the Greek word kybernetes, which means 
steersman, governor, pilot or rudder, having the same root as government. Hence, 
cybernetics looks at the design and function of any system, both physical and social, and 
includes the purpose of making the system more efficient and effective. Enhancing the 
cyborgian condition in Clynes and Kline’s proposed experiment are, therefore, exogenous 
or external agencies, biochemical, mechanical and/or electronic, which extend the self-
regulatory control function of the organism beyond its usual limitations to enable its 
adaptation to new environments.  
 If a cyborg is a being improved or sustained in some way by an external agency, 
then there are certainly many cyborgs among us. Spectacles enhance our vision, we take 
drugs for our ailments, use prostheses, have pacemaker implants, wear hearing aids, and 
even our mobile phones make us cyborgs. Chris Hables Gray, Steve Mentor and Heidi J. 
Figueroa-Sarriera, editors of The Cyborg Handbook, raise the pertinent question: “haven’t 
people always been cyborgs?” (6). The range of human-machine couplings, according to 
Gray et al., defies definition, “from the quadriplegic dependent on a vast array of high 
tech equipment to a small child with an immunization” (4). However, Gray et al. also 
highlight the great difference between a kidney patient on a dialysis machine and a 
combat pilot in his fighter aircraft; the patient uses technologies to maintain normal 
bodily functioning while the pilot cyborg is an enhanced being, “a man-plus” (4). These 
two cyborg examples show there can be different kinds of cyborg bodies, and different 
dimensions of cyborgisation depending on the purpose of the technological 
enhancements. Coming back to the question, have we not always been cyborgs, according 
to Gray et al., the answer is a definite no. They argue we believe we have been cyborgs 
only because of hindsight, stating that: “Cyborgian elements of previous human-tool and 
human-machine relationships are only visible from our current point of view” (6). I 
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concur with this argument because history shows us humans have always been tool 
bearers and, therefore, were technological from the very beginning. The cyborg 
developed, thus, from these human-tool and human-machine relationships, but it now 
represents a “fundamentally new stage” because “in terms of quantity and quality, the 
relationship is new” (Gray et al., 6).  I will now discuss what this fundamentally new 
stage means. 
 One new aspect of the human-machine coupling of the cyborg is the kind of 
machines that are making us cyborgs. These are the new technologies of information and 
communications (abbreviated as ICT for singular and ICTs for plural) that have 
transformed our worlds dramatically in the last two decades. Three objects have been 
fundamentally responsible for the dramatic changes–the computer, the telephone and 
Internet. We can telecommunicate across time zones with multiple persons, watch a live 
feed of a war conflict happening real time in some remote part of the world, engage in 
emotional relationships in virtual realms that also trade in real money, and play a video 
game online simultaneously with thousands of gamers globally. The new technologies are 
compressing our experience of time and space, and even affecting our perception of 
reality. Another aspect of the new stage of the present-day cyborg or cyborg phenomenon 
is that ICTs are so thoroughly integrated into everyday objects–described as ubiquitous or 
pervasive computing-that we have become unaware of their presence, or that we are 
engaging with them in our everyday activities. In this regard, it is difficult to escape 
cyborgisation in a modern city like Singapore where most everyday activities have 
become computerised and automated with the use of ICTs. To show the extent of 
cyborgisation of modern societies today, Gray et al. identified four main sources of 
cyborgian technologies: their strong military origins, civilian medical research, the 
entertainment industry (the examples they give are print, film, games and action figures), 
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and finally, the work arena, particularly, the computer industry but most definitely, in “the 
cybernetization of all industry” (3). So, while we may not be cyborgs ourselves, we most 
certainly live in a cyborg society.  
 The final feature of the cyborg phenomenon relates to a kind of ontological 
anxiety. According to Jennifer Gonzalez, the cyborg has recurred historically, “at 
moments of radical social and cultural change […] When the current ontological model of 
human being does not fit a new paradigm, a hybrid model of existence is required to 
encompass new complex and contradictory lived experience” (61). The cyborg, as 
Gonzalez elaborates, becomes “a historical record of changes that affect our 
understanding of what it means to be human” (61). And what it means to be human is 
necessarily a dynamic process related to ‘being’, the subject of ontology itself.2 The term, 
human being, in fact, should remind us that its ontological status cannot be fixed in its 
meaning, but continually negotiated on an individual and even societal level, especially 
with the onslaught of technology in contemporary times. Thus, the stories we tell about 
cyborgs, whether it is Frankenstein’s monster or Arnold Schwarzenegger’s Terminator, 
are “attempts to understand the broader implications of human/machine co-evolution” on 
an ontological level (Gray et al. 6). One dominant theme in the stories about cyborgs is 
whether machines have taken over humans in our machine-dominated culture where 
human control is progressively being eclipsed with increased automation. In this 
human/machine co-evolution, science fiction has led the way imagining and re-imagining 
cyborgian technologies as well as reconfiguring cyborg bodies, often ambiguously, to 
suggest some of the ontological conundrums and ethical implications that the new 
                                                
2 Ontology, which comes from the Greek words ὄv meaning “to be” or being and -logia meaning 
science, study, theory, is the philosophical study of the nature of being, existence or reality in 




technologies represent and posed by the discursive term, posthuman3. With this 
human/machine co-evolution, I would like to highlight a signifier of the cyborg, which is, 
that it is “always located in a body” (Balsamo 152). This ‘body’ signifier is a necessary 
reminder of the organicity of the cyborg and how this relates to being human, a body that 
has a mind. In assessing the kind of cyborgs being produced under iN2015, the thesis is 
interested in the concerns and issues of the cyborgisation process at this ontological level, 
as well as its political implications and consequences. However, it has to be stated at the 
onset that the term, cyborg, and all its associated words, are not adopted in the iN2015 
document. Why the term, cyborg, is used in analysing iN2015, Singapore’s latest ICT 
policy, needs explanation. To do this, we turn now to the iN2015 report and its 
accompanying infocomm technology roadmap. 
 
2  iN2015 and its technology roadmap 
 Singapore’s first IT plan was rolled out in 1981 targeted at the computerisation of 
the public sector, while the second 1985 National IT plan focused on the private sector to 
improve business productivity. The third, IT2000, launched a vision of an intelligent 
island where IT continued to be emphasised for improving national competitiveness, but 
now becoming promoted as a way to enhance the quality of life for the population at 
home, work, and play. The transition to the ‘intelligent island’ rhetoric was presented as a 
“historical necessity”, essential and inevitable for Singapore’s basic existence, and as 
“trans-national and global in nature, relying on a mode of economy largely determined by 
international flows of knowledge, skills and technology” (Lim, “The Culture of 
Technology of Singapore” 51). In this rhetoric of crisis and survival, Lim argues, 
                                                
3 The term, posthuman, has several interpretations being associated with science fiction, 
futurology, contemporary art, and philosophy, but a discussion on its discursive term will not be 
within the scope of the thesis.  
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technology became a galvanising strategy in nation building negotiating a national 
identity based on creating a “specifically national high-technology environment” 
(“Intelligent Island Discourse” 179 ). The fourth plan, called ICT21 and announced in 
2000, reinforced the intelligent island rhetoric to transform Singapore to a knowledge-
based economy. It has since been succeeded by the fifth and the latest Intelligent Nation 
2015 master plan, or iN2015, which was announced in 2006. The deliberate change from 
‘intelligent island’ to ‘intelligent nation’ signals the continuation of the “nationalist 
project”, as described by Lim, whereby embracing new technology is demanded of its 
citizens not just as a national but also a personal responsibility (“Culture of Technology” 
51).  
 The iN2015 master plan, with its slogan of “An Intelligent Nation, a Global City 
Powered by Infocomm”, intensifies the cyborgisation of Singapore with new technology 
reaching unprecedented levels of ubiquity. As Singapore’s latest ICT policy, iN2015 is 
the most ambitious strategic plan covering ten years compared to all previous 5-year 
plans. Its marketing rhetoric has shifted noticeably from the message of survival and 
crisis management to one of empowerment in a digital future for everyone. To probe this 
iN2015 vision of empowerment, the thesis will examine two documents. The first is the 
ICT policy document by the iN2015 steering committee titled “Innovation. Integration. 
Internationalisation.” referred to in the thesis as the iN2015 report, or just iN2015. The 
second is the latest Infocomm Technology Roadmap report, the fifth so far, or ITR5,4 
which is driving the iN2015 vision. Both are available online. Infocomm Development 
                                                
4 Since 2000, IDA has issued five technology reports called infocomm technology roadmaps. This 
fifth formed the infocomm technology report framing the iN2015 vision, which was launched at 




Authority of Singapore (IDA)5, formed in 1999 with the mission of growing Singapore 
into a global infocomm hub, is the government statutory board driving the iN2015 vision. 
IDA’s website also provides information for the iN2015 vision and mission. From its 
website, iN2015 promises to give “every individual and endeavour seamless access to 
intelligent technology – and with it – the capability to take charge,”  and this capability 
has been described as “the new freedom to connect, innovate, personalise and create.”6 In 
the report, iN2015 proudly heralds the concept of “Infocomm Unlimited” to drive 
“limitless possibilities in our economy and society” […] “to help us become more 
creative and to enjoy life” (34). The iN2015 report continues: “By removing the tedium of 
routine work, for example, people will have more time to dream up the new and different” 
(34).  
 In summary, iN2015 aims to transform lives and businesses, fuel competitive 
enterprise, provide the infrastructure, and develop human capital, in ways that will be 
benefit every individual, business, and organisation. The six goals taken verbatim from 
the iN2015 report are: first, to be number one in the world in harnessing infocomm to add 
value to the economy and society; second, to achieve a two-fold increase in valued added 
of infocomm industry to S$26 billion; third, to achieve a three-fold increase in infocomm 
export revenue to S$60 billion; fourth, to create 80,000 additional jobs; fifth, to achieve 
90% of homes using broadband; and lastly, to have 100% computer ownership in homes 
with school-going children. To achieve these goals, the iN2015 strategies tackle four 
areas: firstly, to spearhead the transformation of key economic sectors, government and 
society through more sophisticated and innovative use of infocomm; secondly, to 
                                                
5 IDA was formed from the merger of the National Computer Board (NCB) and 
Telecommunication Authority of Singapore. NCB, which worked under the Ministry of Finance, 
was responsible for all national IT plans prior to IDA setting up.  
 




establish an ultra-high speed, pervasive, intelligent and trusted infocomm infrastructure; 
thirdly, to develop a globally competitive infocomm industry; and lastly, to develop an 
infocomm-savvy workforce and globally competitive infocomm manpower.  
 iN2015 is, thus, an economic blueprint with concrete goals set for the infocomm 
industry and its usage. But it is also a futurological policy document projective of desires 
for an idealised future that is driven by macro technology trends prescribed in a 
technology roadmap report framing iN2015’s directions and agendas. This technology 
roadmap report, or ITR5, as it is officially referred to, is based on macro technology 
trends in three key areas anticipated to change Singapore’s future dramatically. The three 
areas are sentient technologies, future communications technologies, and the computing 
revolutions infused with nano and biotechnology. Tapping these technological 
developments, ITR5 portrays the future in quite euphoric terms gleaned from the report’s 
preface. The computing wave will see computers disappearing into the background, 
“embedded into the very fabric of our lives”, moving “from the era of “power of a 
mainframe on every desktop” to “power of a mainframe on every person” (ITR5 Preface 
1). The communications wave will see “all Internet Protocol optical transmission 
backbones bringing communities together in cyberspace where there is no restriction of 
distance or time” (ibid 1). Finally, the sentient wave will herald in a new eco-system with 
embedded sensors in powerful computing nodes and devices that can sense and interact 
with one another, creating smart sentient spaces or  “a world of things that think” (ibid 2).  
 The ITR5 report is, basically, a summary of the latest technology developments 
and concepts, collated from on-going research and product development programmes by 
private and public organisations, other national technology roadmaps, as well as military 
roadmaps. The common thread in all these different domains of research lies in “themes 
alluding to living seamlessly and working productively in a smart or sentient space” 
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enabled by technologies from computing, communications, and distributed sensing and 
embedded systems (ITR5 Sentient Technologies 1). ITR5 cites current research by 
leading scientists and global corporations such as Intel (proactive computing), Internet’s 
founding father Tim Berners-Lee (The Semantic Web), Xeroc Parc (calm computing), 
MIT (affective computing), Ericsson (the Internet of Things), Motorola (Intelligence 
Everywhere), and Philips (Ambient Intelligence). The tone of the report is distinctly 
upbeat and positive from its euphoric expectations of new technologies when it exclaims: 
“The applications and potential opportunities are virtually unlimited for sentient spaces, 
and only limited by our own imagination” (ibid 5). It is necessary to see what examples of 
smart sentient objects are coming our way to understand this euphoria in ITR5. They 
include: a home mirror connected to an online wardrobe shopping service; a garden glass 
table with online gaming; our toilet mirror screening animated cartoon as a ‘live’ guide, 
for example, to make brushing teeth an enjoyable task for kids; and a living room wall 
that acts as smart ambient screen display or which can be made ‘alive’ with painted 
temperature sensors. There are computing wearables being developed, such as the smart 
baby jacket to prevent sudden infant death syndrome, sensors woven into underwear 
garments to monitor the heart to warn of impending stroke symptoms, and smart 
sunglasses that host camera, microphone, wireless MEMs (micro-electronic mechanical 
systems). Virtual reality environments will be created outdoors. For example, a video 
projection in the park could tell stories about its historical and monumental past, or 
educate us on nature conservation. Mixed reality will mix the real and the virtual, such as 
reading Shakespeare’s Hamlet and seeing a 3D character appearing on the book 
delivering a soliloquy, or seeing animals from exotic lands projected in our immediate 
environment and playing with them in their real physical space. To keep our bodies 
healthy, ITR5 talks about care phones to monitor wearer’s diabetes, diet phones 
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containing sensors that can measure human-body fat, and beauty phones with massage 
functions and sensors to gauge skin humidity level. The expectant hopes expressed in 
these future technologies are revealed when ITR5 concludes that these new technologies 
might even stem Singapore’s falling birth rate. By removing the “burden” on young 
homemakers, ITR5 states, “there is a possibility that these stressed individuals will 
consider having more babies to reverse the country’s declining population” (Executive 
Summary 4).  
 As a futurological policy document, the iN2015 master plan based on ITR5’s 
forecast of future technology would seem more like a projection of desires for a techno 
future rather than about realisable futures themselves. The technological future painted in 
iN2015 has almost the aura of science fiction with applications that are either superfluous 
such as the care phones and diet phones, or phantasmagorical such as the mixed reality 
scenario of playing with exotic animals in one’s living room. Many research ideas are 
presented as if they were already realised and done deals, and the language used is 
deliberately seductive. If technology is intelligent or smart, then surely it will benefit 
every one and desired by all. What ITR5 represents is technotopia: a future made perfect 
by technology because technology can solve our problems and satisfy all our wants and 
needs. The meaning of ‘intelligent’ in the 2015 future, we learn, is none other than total 
seamless Internet connectivity in our environments and smart sentient spaces with 
effortless and proactive human-machine-Internet interfaces. The iN2015 vision and the 
ITR5 mission, thus, have concerns and issues for the cyborgisation of intelligent nation 
Singapore, which I would like now to address. iN2015, it was stated earlier, does not use 
the term, cyborg, and ITR5 makes one cursory reference to an article titled “Becoming 
Cyborgs” from the Computer Science Corporation’s Leading Edge Forum (Sentient 
Technologies 13). The article tucked under the section examining the impact of sentient 
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technologies on individuals and society was summarily dismissed after a one-sentence 
quotation: “Computing, biotechnology and robotics can create a world in which humans 
may be a rare breed” (ibid 13). Without any commentary, ITR5 moved on to discuss the 
positive side of sentient technologies, lasting several pages long, and their impact on 
society and individuals. The omission of the word, cyborg, or any discussion of the 
complex and sometimes incongruous processes of cyborgisation of Singapore under its 
ICT policies, is problematic. It signifies the supreme confidence in a technotopia framing 
the techno future ahead for Singapore under the IN2105 plan. At this stage, I would need 
to clarify further how the term, cyborg, will be used in the thesis. 
 The term, cyborg, moves away from just being a mechanically enhanced being, to 
be associated more specifically with new technologies centred around ICTs. The thesis 
will be using this term in this context: that to be a cyborg or to be in a cyborg world will 
mean to be dependent on these new technologies in some way or other in our everyday 
lives. Following on, the term, cyborgisation, will refer to the introduction of these new 
technologies into a system for the purpose of enhancing its functioning, while the term, 
cyborgian technologies, will refer to new technologies or ICTs and used interchangeably 
with these two latter terms throughout the thesis. But, if we are not computer savvy or 
connected to the Internet ourselves, does that mean we are not cyborgs and, thus, can 
escape cyborgisation? After all, globally, there are more people without access to a 
computer than those with access, while billions still live without any basic 
telecommunication. How do these people fit into the global cyborg world? The thesis 
takes the position that cyborgisation today affects everyone, even for someone who is not 
a Internet user marked in this instance by their separation from access to new 
technologies. This cyborg future of iN2015 will be deconstructed to uncover hidden 
assumptions and contradictions, so that the concerns and issues underpinning the 
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cyborgisation of Singapore can be brought to the surface. The first would be the message 
of progress inherently linked with technology. 
 
3  Technology as an ideology of progress? 
 In analysing the impact of technology in society, technology is often treated either 
as an exogenous and given factor, which is external to social processes or dynamics, or as 
an endogenous and constitutive factor, that is, internal to social process or dynamics 
(Talalay, Farrands and Tooze 2-3). When it is taken as exogenous, technology is largely 
viewed as instrumental to be appraised as a tool or as an object of policy. With this 
exogenous approach, technology becomes associated in its material form as objects to be 
used and applied, and its instrumental nature assessed mainly in terms of ends and 
means.7 As an endogenous and constitutive factor, technology is understood “as being 
shaped by social forces at least as much as it shapes these forces” (ibid 3).  According to 
Gillian Youngs, when technology is treated in the first approach as exogenous and 
instrumental in nature, it becomes reduced to the technological imperative, that is, as an 
evolutionary movement of technical progress or advancement (“Culture and the 
Technological Imperative” 32-33). For Youngs, this notion of the technological 
imperative is tautologically “a way of explaining and legitimising ideas of so-called 
progress,” and technology becomes represented as “an ideology of progress” (ibid 33). 
Such an approach totally overlooks social context; that technologies are “introduced into 
                                                
7 Most academic studies of Singapore’s ICT policies have treated technology as an exogenous 
factor, that is, as a tool and object of policy, focusing on their goals and efficacies of 
implementation. Major examples are: Linda Low’s detailed analysis of Singapore One (the 
precursor for the Next Generation National Broadband Network in the iN2015 plan) discusses the 
dichotomy of the hard techno-infrastructural and soft socioeconomic issues in a fully-fledged 
knowledge society; Choo Chun Wei appraisal of IT2000’s vision of an intelligent island, 
questioning the technical and social contexts of intelligence; and Alwyn Lim’s several survey of 
the domestication of technology in the developmental process behind Singapore’s modernity, 
adopting a socio-historical survey and deliberating on the official rhetoric used of tropes like 
survival, crisis management, and more recently, utopianism. 
14 
 
existing sets of social relations and processes, and will impact on them and evolve as part 
of them in anticipated and unanticipated, constructed and serendipitous ways” (Youngs, 
“Global Political Economy” 3). Technology as an ideology of progress could be described 
as technological determinism, which sees technological change as an independent factor 
impacting society from outside of society. Donald Mackenzie and Judy Wajcman believe 
technological determinism is problematic because it provides a narrow and incomplete 
picture of technology (5). They explain why technological determinism must not be 
accepted as a theory of technology:  
The view that technology just changes, either following science or of its 
accord, promotes a passive attitude to technological change. It focuses our 
minds on how to adapt to technological change, not on how to shape it. It 
removes a vital aspect of how we live from the sphere of public discussion, 
choice and politics. (5) 
 I would describe the technotopia in the iN2015 vision as one subscribing to 
technological determinism premised on the rhetoric that technology promises a better 
tomorrow with all problems solvable with technology. Such is the ideology of 
technotopia, a frame of mind that constantly looks towards an idealised future, while 
often ignoring the socio-political and technological dimensions of current problems.  
Such a belief in technotopia ignores the fact that technology is inherently political in 
particularly two ways. Firstly, technologies can be invented or designed, consciously or 
unconsciously, to serve certain social options and close others, and secondly, certain 
technologies are by their very nature political in a specific way that is strongly compatible 
with particular kinds of political relationships (Winner 29, 33). Winner characterises 
political relationships as centralised or decentralised, egalitarian or inegalitarian, 
repressive or liberating. The example he gives is the supply of energy: nuclear power 
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would necessitate a techno-scientific-industrial-military elite to commission and maintain 
the system, compared to solar energy that allows for a more disaggregated and widely 
distributed management of the community’s needs. In other words, technology embodies 
specific forms of power and authority that are embedded in the social and economic 
system, necessitating questions like how is power generated, owned, used and controlled. 
When technology is linked automatically with progress, we often do not see the ‘power’ 
exercised by technical objects or technical systems. Judy Wajcman argues this is not 
surprising because when technical systems are completely integrated into the social 
fabric, they become ‘naturalised’ disappearing into the landscape (40). In the techno 
future of iN2015, we would increasingly be oblivious to the presence of technology as we 
enter an era of seamless connectivity and interactivity.  
 Even if we accept that technology and progress are linked in some way, Leo Marx’s 
rejoinder, “Progress towards what?” needs urgently to be asked of the cyborg future in 
iN2015 (3). The survival trope lurks in the iN2015 vision, which, as articulated in its 
goals, is also about thousands of jobs and billions of dollars of export revenue for 
Singapore. While the iN2015 goals are undeniably urgent for Singapore’s economic 
future, the role of technology as an endogenous factor on its political economy needs to 
be investigated to reveal a proper study of key areas, such as power and inequality, the 
impact of change, and questions of empowerment and disempowerment in relation to 
technology. Such questioning of technology cannot but assume a critical stance towards 
technology. This may be seen “as anti-technology, as an attempt to impose upon 
technology rigid, negative, political controls” (MacKenzie and Wajcman 6). Such a 
stance, that is, to question technology, could be construed as querulous particularly in 
Singapore, when the relentless deployment of ICTs has proceeded in an environment 
where policy-making has been “unencumbered”, robust parliamentary debate is lacking 
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and mass media is mostly “pro-PAP and pro-government” 8  (Mahizhnan and Yap 1755). 
Furthermore, the public has been accustomed to acquiescing in government rationale 
behind policy decisions, believing that a corrupt-free and uncapricious government 
governs Singapore, and which always has the public good at heart (ibid 1755). How can a 
critical and necessary appraisal on the cyborgisation of Singapore under iN2015 be 
framed that is not understood as anti-technology? The thesis will now suggest a critical 
framework that takes us back to the cyborg to provide us with a valuable tool to help with 
investigating iN2015. 
 
4  Cyborg ontology and politics 
 The cyborg myth has emerged in our machine-dominated culture witnessing 
greater and greater human-and-machine symbiotic interfaces both to normalise human 
functions and to enhance human functioning. In this cyborg discourse, the term, 
posthuman, has emerged to question what it means to be human, and if the technological 
has taken over human agency in this symbiotic relationship. How real and critical are 
these concerns? To help find possible answers, the thesis calls upon a particular cyborg, 
one that is highly imaginative and resolutely political from a different fictive world. Meet 
Donna Haraway’s cyborg, “a creature of social reality as well as a creature of fiction” 
from her seminal essay, “A Cyborg Manifesto: Science, Technology and Socialist-
Feminist in the Late Twentieth Century” (149-150). Haraway claims:  
By the late twentieth century, our time, a mythic time, we are all chimeras, 
theorized and fabricated hybrids of machine and organism; in short, we are 
cyborgs. The cyborg is our ontology; it gives us our politics. (150) 
                                                
8 PAP stands for People’s Action Party, which is the ruling government party in Singapore. 
Described as a one-party state because of the party’s overwhelming dominance of Parliament, 
Singapore has only two out of the eighty-four parliamentary seats represented by the elected 
opposition from the last election of 2006.  
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Haraway is suggesting accepting fully the ontological status of the cyborg from its 
machine-and-organism symbiosis because returning to its separate states is not possible or 
even desirable any longer. If we recall a signifier of the cyborg that it is always located in 
a body, Haraway’s cyborg provides a platform for examining these productive tensions 
and possibilities between the technological and organic, at the ontological level, to 
discover what is essentially human in this symbiotic machine-human relationship. To be 
human, as discussed earlier, is a dynamic process related to ‘being’, and hence, the 
ontological status of a human being cannot be fixed in its meaning, but one that needs to 
be continually negotiated. On the question of politics, Haraway’s statement that the 
cyborg gives us our politics, however, is more ambiguous. Her general position on 
technology is quite clear. She is not a technological determinist and she does not believe 
that “the information revolution automatically produces liberatory effects” (Sofoulis 368). 
Neither is she anti-science being a trained biologist herself, nor one who rejects 
technology (Hekman 85). At the same time, she realises the new technologies have 
produced “the scary new networks”, which she describes as the “informatics of 
domination” intensifying the categories of class, race, and gender (161). Is Haraway 
suggesting that the new technologies have increasingly more politics of domination and 
inequalities, and/or is she suggesting that accepting new technologies has become a 
necessary political strategy to survive in her informatics of domination? These questions 
raised by Haraway’s cyborg are crucial as we experience increasing cyborgisation in our 
present times. iN2015 sees the cyborg as a technologically enhanced state that is desirable 
but is totally uncritical in its embrace of the technologically possible, unconditionally 
adopting new technologies without deliberation over their consequent socio-political 
impact, or even ontological possibilities. Twenty-five years later after the Manifesto is 
written, are we witnessing an informatics of domination replicating itself in the cyborgian 
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future of iN2015?  What ontology and politics are inherent with new technologies, and 
how can we adopt a proper relationship with cyborgian technologies that are now a 
crucial part of modern societies?  
 If we accept Haraway’s cyborg ontologically and politically, do we get implicated 
in the bind with technology? Haraway’s techno-politics through her cyborg has come 
under criticism from another critic of technology, Paul Virilio. Stemming from his 
“epistemo-technical” approach (Virilio and Lotringer 36) that references Heidegger’s 
meta-philosophical discourse on the essence of technology,9 Virilio argues that the speed 
imperative and the potential accident inherent in technology come from its military 
origins. From his study of speed in history called dromology, Virilio asserts that “history 
progresses at the speed of its weapon systems” (68).  The speed imperative in new 
technology has become a source of capital and power such that the technology of pure 
speed changes politics more than politics is able to change technology: a situation that 
Virilio foresees rapidly worsening towards “an integral and globally constituted accident” 
(Virilio and Armitage, “Kosovo W@R” 192). The thesis hopes to locate positions where 
Haraway and Virilio intersect, and where they depart, in order to clarify how Haraway’s 
cyborg metaphor can still be relevant in analysing today’s new technologies. While the 
thesis deals mainly with these arguments from Haraway and Virilio, a small but necessary 
detour will be made to Gillian Youngs whom we encountered earlier in her cautionary 
note about technology as an ideology of progress. Youngs adopts an approach in her 
study of technology that is anchored in political economy analysis. Her examination of 
the role of technology on the global political economy shows inequality as the driving 
force behind development, cloaked ever more so in the empowerment language of 
                                                
9 In Heidegger’s famed essay, “The Question Concerning Technology”, he argues that when we 
affirm or deny technology, this enslaves us to technology. But worse than this either-or position, 
is to consider technology as neutral. For Heidegger, the essence of technology must be understood 
so that a free relationship to technology can established, one that is not enslaving. 
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technology. Her argument reaches the same conclusion, that of growing socio-political 
disparities, as Haraway’s exposition of her informatics of domination, and Virilio’s of 
speed as a source of capital and power. But it is her position on the persistent state of 
inequality that helps to illuminate the contradictions of modern technology and the 
promise of progress. Ultimately, the thesis is interested in bringing these arguments from 
the three writers to provide a critical discourse on the cyborgisation of intelligent nation 
Singapore driven by the iN2015 vision. 
  
5  Structure of the thesis 
 The first chapter examines cyborg ontology and politics through Haraway’s 
Manifesto to engage with her multifarious cyborg. It seeks primarily to understand how 
the ‘border war’ between organism and machine ends up constructing her cyborg as a 
metaphor holding promises and hopes as well as dangers and threats in dealing with new 
technologies. The cyborg hybrid gives occasion to reflect on, what Haraway describes as, 
three boundary breakdowns: human and animal, machine and organism, and the physical 
and non-physical. In these breakdowns, new technologies described as “the disturbingly 
alive machines” have reduced all living organisms into biotic components or information-
processing units (152). Such cyborg ontology and politics have resulted in the informatics 
of domination intensifying the categories of class, race, and gender. Virilio’s war model 
of the growth of the modern city comes next under the spotlight for the ways this has led 
to ‘speed-space’ and chronopolitics, reinforcing Haraway’s informatics of domination. 
Youngs comes in to show how technology is one of the major factors today in the global 
political economy, in which power is possessed and maintained, and how inequalities are 
distributed and persist along socio-economic and gender grounds. She questions the 
mismatch between the theory and practice of neoliberalism that espouses goals of equality 
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and equal rights, even as evidence points in the opposite direction with inequality actually 
driving growth and development. The concluding question after looking at these three 
writers is whether cyborg politics and ontology can be reconfigured to confront these 
dominations in Haraway’s post-gender world that is consciously struggling against 
“unity-through-domination” or “unity-through-incorporation.” 
 The second chapter returns to the iN2015 vision to examine what kind of cyborg 
body/bodies are being produced, and how such cyborg body/bodies relate to existing 
social reality, given the promise of infocomm for every individual. Two IDA videos 
marketing the iN2015 vision provide vital clues through their narratives to see how 
individual bodies, and whose bodies, are ‘enriched’ and ‘enhanced’, words that have been 
constantly used to emphasise the empowerment message behind iN2015. What do these 
narratives tell us about the ontology and politics in the empowerment of cyborg bodies in 
intelligent nation Singapore in 2015? Does everybody have the same empowerment 
becoming a cyborg or are these identities already economically determined? The chapter 
also addresses cyborg identity in iN2015 as a kind of technological citizenship in 
Singapore that obliges citizens to be technologically knowledgeable to the extent of being 
mainly media savvy users and consumers in the knowledge-based economy, and how this 
relates to the structures of inequalities being produced in intelligent nation Singapore. 
Haraway’s cyborg, as female and feminist, spotlights the gender relationship to new 
technology, a subject that warrants attention given the ferociously gendered roles in the 
iN2015 vision. 
 In the third chapter, Virilio’s dromology becomes relevant for the ways ITR5 
demands constant changes in the Singapore economy and for society to keep up with 
technological innovations. The chapter investigates how the technology of pure speed is 
responsible in chronopolitics for producing new speed classes such as “the global kinetic 
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elites” and “the virtual class” as new centres of power, while at the same time, 
aggravating growing socio-economic inequalities. With technology transfers between 
military, civilian and entertainment worlds, the chapter discusses a condition called the 
politics of disappearance, creating the hypermodern world imagined in iN2105, where 
sensual and bodily experiences are deterritoralised in favour of a virtual world. The 
chapter closes looking at how ITR5 views problems of the cyborgian future from its 
technocratic frame of mind through Virilio’s perspective of technology and its potential 
accident.  
 Finally, the concluding chapter returns to the central questions querying the kind 
of politics and ontology unfolding and impinging on cyborg bodies in intelligent nation 
Singapore. Without a doubt, iN2015 is speeding up the cyborgisation of Singapore, 
obliging everyone to become technological citizens to live a life in technicity, a 
hypermodern techno lifestyle, in a cyborgian society witnessing greater socio-economic 
disparities and gender inequalities. Haraway’s anti-dualism in the ontology of the cyborg 
and its techno-politics, Virilio’s techno-speed criticism, and Youngs’ nexus between 
inequality and technology, provide critical tools to deal with the cyborgian future in 
intelligent nation Singapore. Where they intersect, they expose the cyborg future as one 
fraught with the politics of inequalities that must be continually exposed behind the gloss 
of a technologically perfect, hypermodern world. However, as Haraway asserts, there is 
no turning back materially and ideologically. The cyborg is our ontology, and while it 
may be responsible for a kind of politics, we need to deal with the informatics of 
domination rather than to jump on the technology bandwagon, just to keep ahead. What 
would be the position between Haraway’s cyborg that does not and cannot reject 
technology, and Virilio’s cautionary disavowal of these technologies of speed? Such a 
question underlines the complex ways in which new technologies interact with the 
22 
 
political economy, and how that interaction produces the ambiguities and duplicities of 
empowerment for different cyborg bodies.  

























  Chapter One 
  Cyborg Ontology and Politics: Haraway, Virilio & Youngs 
 
 When Donna Haraway wrote the Cyborg Manifesto, she was looking for a 
metaphor that suited its times, that of the 1980s. Marked by the resurgence of the armed 
race between the United States and the Soviet Union, and the growing neoliberalism in 
Reagan’s America and Thatcher’s Britain, the era also witnessed the beginnings of the 
Internet and scientific developments in genetic engineering that led to the Human 
Genome Project. Haraway had a specific audience: feminists, at a crossroad in search for 
new paradigms, as universal theories informing feminism in its second wave became no 
longer relevant  (Hekman 85). The purpose of the Manifesto, in Haraway’s words, was, 
“to build an ironic political myth faithful to feminism, socialism and materialism” (149). 
When the Manifesto was published, its impact, described as nothing short of cataclysmic, 
was one that shifted debate about culture and identity all through the late 20th century. 
This chapter will look at the major arguments in the Manifesto in order to understand 
Haraway’s cyborg who is anti-dualism and advocates techno-politics. How relevant is 
Haraway’s cyborg metaphor as a lens to inspect new technologies and the cyborgisation 
processes at work today? To find out, the chapter also engages Paul Virilio’s techno-
speed criticism that is ultimately critical of all cyborgian technologies, and briefly, Gillian 
Youngs who reveals a driving force in current economic systems that undermines the 
empowerment message in technology. This chapter argues that Haraway’s cyborg 
continues to provide a relevant analysis of today’s new technologies but questions the 
efficacy of her techno-politics.  To begin, Haraway’s cyborg now takes centre-stage.  
 
1.1  Cyborg ontology and leaky boundaries 
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 The Cyborg Manifesto sits in a collection of essays in a book titled Simians, 
Cyborgs, and Women (149-181). The three that are named in this title are described by 
Haraway as “odd boundary creatures” for they signify “a destabilising place in the great 
Western evolutionary, technological, and biological narratives” (2). To understand what 
she means, the key word here is boundary. A boundary means a dividing line that marks 
the limits of an area, and boundaries can be crossed, contested, breached, and even 
altered. For Haraway, a professor with a PhD in biology, nature, with its shifting 
boundaries, has always been constructed, so much so that these constructions are “crucial 
cultural processes for people who need and hope to live in a world less riddled by the 
domination of race, colonialism, class, gender, and sexuality” (2). The odd boundary 
creatures, she points out, are ‘monsters’, which have much to share with the word, 
demonstrate, and therefore, they signify (2). How do they signify? Monsters, popularly 
understood as large, ugly, frightening, or wicked, disrupt our understanding of what is 
commonly accepted as normal and human, and therefore, monsters disrupt identities.  In 
the same way, hybrids seen as a superior state over its constituent parts also disrupt 
boundaries. Therein lies the nature of the cyborg – its monstrosity from one perspective 
and its hybridity from another perspective, and both to do with boundaries. The references 
to monsters and hybrids in the cultural discourse of the 1980’s were very much influenced 
by scientific research going on, especially, in genetic engineering (facilitated greatly with 
ICTs). Technoscience was producing “new objects” having more and more “leaky and 
unstable boundaries formed in the interaction of material and semiotic effects” (Sofoulis 
370). Recalling Haraway: 
“By the late twentieth century, our time, a mythic time, we are all 
chimeras, theorized and fabricated hybrids of machine and organism; in 
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short, we are cyborgs. The cyborg is our ontology; it gives us our politics” 
(150). 
What does it mean that the cyborg is our ontology? And how does it give us our politics? 
To find answers, Haraway’s cyborg has to be investigated ontologically, after which its 
political nature will be discussed. We begin with the ontology of the cyborg and its 
boundary breakdowns. 
 The cyborg, an abbreviation of cybernetic organism, is part organism and part 
machine, and this relation between organism and machine, according to Haraway, has 
been a “border war”, given the history of capitalism, the tradition of progress, and the 
evolution of science and technology (150). A border war implies a contestation of 
boundary. In the cybernetic organism or cyborg, this border war is between the organism 
or its organicity and the machine or the technological, over a boundary that is unstable or 
“leaky” (Haraway 152). The border war between organism and machine has given 
occasion to reflect on three crucial boundary breakdowns. The three boundaries pertain to 
human and animal, machine and organism, and the physical and non-physical; all three 
having leaky distinctions. The first human-and-animal boundary, Haraway explains, has 
been completely breached by late 20th century such that the need for a separation between 
the two is no longer much considered. Examples of the animal-human symbiotic 
relationship flourish in “language, tool use, social behaviour, mental events”, and most 
certainly, in the world of biology that Haraway comes from (151). Thus, she asserts that 
biology and evolutionary theory have “simultaneously produced modern organisms as 
objects of knowledge and reduced the line between humans and animals to a faint trace 
[…]” (152). With genome research revealing common genes between humans and 
animals, Haraway’s point is indisputable. She also mentions the animal rights movement 
to remind us of growing affinities and the pleasures of connections with the animal world. 
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The cyborg, she asserts, “appears in myth precisely where the boundary between human 
and animal is transgressed”; thus, cyborgs signal “disturbingly and pleasurably tight 
coupling” (152). Here we are reminded of both the cyborg’s monstrous and hybrid nature. 
 The second boundary breakdown or leaky distinction is between animal-human 
(organism) and machine, more commonly perceived as the cyborg configuration rather 
than the animal and human symbiosis. Cyborgs, hybrid of organism and machine, are 
now compounded of “special kinds of machines and special kinds of organisms 
appropriate to the late 20th century” (Haraway 1). For Haraway, cyborgs are definitively 
post-Second World War hybrid entities, where new technologies have transformed its two 
constituent parts, organism and machine. The first, organisms, which includes humans 
and all other organic creatures, have become “information systems, texts, and 
ergonomically controlled labouring, desiring and reproducing systems”, and the second, 
the machines themselves have also become “communications systems, texts, and self-
acting, ergonomically designed apparatuses” (ibid 1). Before the language of cybernetics 
was discovered, machines were tools and appendages, “not self-moving, self-designing, 
autonomous”, but now “late 20th century machines have made thoroughly ambiguous the 
difference between natural and artificial, mind and body, self-developing and externally 
designed, and many other distinctions that used to apply to organisms and machines” 
(ibid 152). These latter machines are precisely the modern ICTs or, what the thesis has 
been referring to as, the cyborgian technologies. 
 The third boundary between physical and non-physical, a subset of the second 
boundary, Haraway reflects, is new and still imprecise at this stage. What is clear is that 
the modern machines, as micro-electronic devices with their computer chip, are 
relentlessly “everywhere” and “invisible” (Haraway 153). The machines could be our 
everyday electronic devices, such as home-use videos all the way to cruise missiles. 
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These micro-electronic devices, getting smaller and more miniaturised, have become 
“light and clean” being purveyors of pure information, signals and electromagnetic 
waves. It is the ubiquity and invisibility of these “sunshine belt machines” that makes 
them deadly, as they are “hard to see politically and materially” (Haraway 153).  
 In understanding Haraway’s statement that the cyborg is our ontology, what is 
important to grasp is the boundary breakdowns and their leaky nature. Hybridity or, for 
that matter, monstrosity, can only take place precisely because of the leaky boundaries. 
The boundary breakdowns compel Haraway to reject the dualisms that have riddled 
Western thinking, such as “mind and body, animal and machine, idealism and materialism 
in the social practices, symbolic formulations, and physical artefacts associated with ‘high 
technology’ and scientific culture […]” (154).  Hence, the cyborg metaphor is about 
breaking down boundaries and, ontologically, the absence of an essential unitary state of 
being. While the coupling can be pleasurable, it can also be disturbing. This is the 
cyborg’s “main trouble”: it is “the illegitimate offspring of militarism and patriarchal 
capitalism, not to mention state socialism” (Haraway 151). From these origins, the cyborg 
world could also be, Haraway admits, “the final imposition of a grid of control on the 
planet” (154).  How this can happen, Haraway warns us, is because: “Our machines are 
disturbingly lively, and we ourselves frighteningly inert” (152). What Haraway is 
implying here is that humans are inert and passive, while machines today have 
capabilities that humans could be unaware of or have no control over. The ‘disturbingly 
lively’ machines, in fact, are already producing “the scary new networks”, which 
Haraway labels as “the informatics of domination” (161). Hence, she aptly describes her 
cyborg as “oppositional, utopian and completely without innocence” (151). It is 
oppositional because it opposes essentialisms and dualisms; it is utopian because it 
celebrates potential couplings of human hybridity with the animal-machine worlds; and it 
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is completely without innocence because of its main trouble, forming the informatics of 
domination, which we will now encounter.   
 
1.2  Cyborg Politics – the informatics of domination 
 The cyborgian times have witnessed an informatics of domination brought on by 
the new machines that are, in Haraway’s lucid words, disturbingly alive. These new 
machines have reduced organisms to biotic components, that is, information-processing 
units, which are understood and studied in terms of “design, boundary constraints, rates of 
flows, systems logics, costs of lowering constraints” (162). Everything exists in systems 
architecture, reducible to statistics and probability; even sexual reproduction, which 
Haraway quotes as an example, has become one reproductive strategy among many 
assessed in terms of costs and benefits within a systems environment. She says: “No 
objects, spaces, or bodies are sacred in themselves; any component can be interfaced with 
any other if the proper standard, the proper code, can be constructed for processing 
signals in a common language” (163). In other words, the world and every living thing in 
it are now reduced to information as quantifiable data and “a problem in coding” 
(Haraway 164). Haraway sets up a list comparing the “comfortable old hierarchical 
dominations” of white capitalist patriarchy translating to the informatics of domination, 
mediated by new technologies (161). Examples given are microelectronics mediating the 
“translations of labour into robotics and word processing, sex into genetic engineering 
and reproductive technologies, and mind into artificial intelligence and decision 
procedures” (Haraway 165).  Modern biology has become one of inscription rather than 
one as clinical practice, meaning that organisms are now reduced into problems of 
29 
 
“genetic coding and read-out” (Haraway 164). In this list10, it is important to bear in mind 
that the informatics of domination have not necessarily done away with preceding socio-
cultural-political issues, many of which have been re-cast in the language and semantics 
mediated by the new technologies. Since her cyborg is female and feminist11, let’s look at 
the situation of women in the informatics of domination in order to better grasp how 
things have changed. 
 ICTs have certainly changed women’s participation in the economy. The image of 
women in the integrated circuit is generally associated with Asian women in the 
multinational microelectronic factories employed for their nimble fingers.  Often women 
accept lower wages than men who therefore shun the work. In this context, Haraway 
mentions how women are integrated but at the same exploited in a world system of 
production/reproduction12 governed by these new technologies. But this image of women 
in the integrated circuit (Rachel Grossman qtd in Haraway 165) has also been borrowed 
to show the dispersion of women’s place in the informatics of domination. The traditional 
division of the public and private domains in describing women’s lives in the informatics 
of domination is no longer relevant and, in fact, has become “a totally misleading 
ideology” (Haraway 170). The public/private domains for the working class would have 
been factory and home; for bourgeois life, it is the market and home; and of gender 
existence into personal and political realms. Haraway then takes idealised social locations 
from the perspective of advanced capitalist societies - home, market, paid work place, 
                                                
10 More examples of the pairing in the list are: representation - simulation; depth, integrity - 
surface, boundary; eugenics - population control; hygiene - stress management; reproduction - 
replication; scientific management in home/factory - global factory/electronic cottage. 
 
11 Haraway does not state categorically in the Manifesto that her cyborg is female, although this is 
implied and confirmed only much later in an interview with Nicholas Gane in 2006. 
 
12 Reproductive technologies are another area of how women’s bodies are regulated and 
disciplined through the new technologies, which forms a whole subject on its own and is beyond 
the scope of the thesis.  
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state, school, clinic-hospital and church - to show how social relations and, especially, 
women’s position in these locations have been mediated by new technologies. As an 
example, let’s look at paid work place in the informatics of domination, and I quote her 
verbatim here: 
Continued intense sexual and racial division of labour, but considerable 
growth of membership in privileged occupational categories for many 
white women and people of colour; impact of new technologies on 
women’s work in clerical, service, manufacturing (especially textiles), 
agriculture, electronics; international restructuring of the working classes; 
development of new time arrangements to facilitate the homework 
economy (flex time, part time, over time, no time); homework and out 
work; increased pressures for two-tiered wage structures; significant 
numbers of people in cash-dependent populations world-wide with no 
experience or no further hope of stable employment; most labour 
‘marginal’ or ‘feminised’. (171) 
The world of new technologies has produced the ‘homework economy’ outside the home, 
characterised by the presence of female jobs described as jobs literally done by women 
and redefined as female and feminised, whether performed by women or men (Richard 
Gordon qtd in Haraway 166).  What ‘feminised’ means here, is “to be made extremely 
vulnerable; able to be disassembled, reassembled, exploited as a reserve labour force; 
seen less as workers than as servers; subjected to time arrangements on and off the paid 
job that makes a mockery of a limited work day […]” (Haraway 166). With the 
feminisation of poverty (that is also now affecting men), it is now common to be 
employed, and, at the same time, poor.  
31 
 
 Haraway characterises the informatics of domination as a time of intense and 
massive insecurity together with cultural impoverishment, and the total failure of 
“subsistence networks for the most vulnerable” (172). Thus, the informatics of 
domination and the advent of new technologies are fraught increasingly with more, not 
less politics, intensified along the hierarchies of class, race, and gender. In analysing 
women’s situation restructured through the social relations of science and technology, 
Haraway is rejecting technological determination, and sees instead technology as steeped 
in a historical system of structured relations among people. Hence, she calls urgently for a 
socialist-feminist politics addressing science and technology, and here, she invokes her 
cyborg.  
 
1.3  Haraway’s cyborg myth in a post-gender world 
 Recalling the three boundary breakdowns, the first between human and animal 
gives Haraway hope for the way to approach the other two boundary breakdowns. The 
pleasurable, affective, and symbiotic coupling of the human-animal relationship gives 
Haraway encouragement for her cyborg: 
From another perspective, a cyborg world might be about lived social and 
bodily realities in which people are not afraid of their joint kinship with 
animals and machines, not afraid of permanently partial identities and 
contradictory standpoints. The political struggle is to see from both 
perspectives at once because each reveals both dominations and 
possibilities unimaginable from the other vantage point. (154) 
The cyborg myth, thus, represents “transgressed boundaries, potent fusions and dangerous 
possibilities” (Haraway 154). In the early part of the Manifesto, Haraway says: “The 
cyborg is a creature in a post-gender world” (150) and near its end, she alludes to the 
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utopian dream of “a monstrous world without gender” (181). What does she mean by 
‘post-gender’? For Haraway, ‘post-gender’ does not mean a utopia where being a man or 
woman does not matter, or a world “without desire, sex and an unconscious” (Gane 150). 
Neither is it a “transhumanist technoenhancement” utopia (ibid 140). Post-gender, she 
means, is how peoples and worlds are reconstructed as information (examples will be the 
Human Genome Project and Visible Human Project). In fact, she sees the world both as 
‘post-gender’ and, at the same time, one that is “ferociously gender-in-place” (ibid 137), 
evidenced by women’s dispersed and changing positions in the integrated circuit as 
described earlier. But post-gender, for Haraway, was a way to move away from looking at 
techno-science from the feminist response of that time, seeing technology as masculine 
and rejecting technology to return to the female/nature/feminine world. In the Manifesto, 
Haraway makes her rejection of this position very clear, that is, the position closely 
identified with the radical and eco-feminists, to the extent that the Manifesto was seen as 
dropping feminism altogether. But Haraway’s cyborg is resolutely feminist. Her rejection 
of the radical or the eco-feminist position stems from a rejection of the totalising process 
in the search for the unity of women. This happens when the women’s movement is 
taxonomised, making “one’s own political tendencies appear to be the telos of the whole” 
(Haraway 156). Taxonomies of feminism produce epistemologies, she elaborates, which 
end up policing deviation from accepted norms. This results in either incorporating or 
marginalising different feminisms. If this theoretical and practical struggle against “unity-
through-domination or unity-through-incorporation” is vigorously adopted, then 
justifications for all other -isms such as “patriarchy, colonialism, humanism, positivism, 
essentialism, scientism and other unlamented –isms” are undermined (ibid 157). This is 
why gender, race, and class, understood now historically, cannot provide “the basis for 
belief in ‘essential’ unity” (ibid 155).  Where gender is concerned, there is nothing about 
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being ‘female’, which naturally binds women; ‘women’ itself being “a highly complex 
category constructed in contested sexual scientific discourses and other social practices” 
(ibid 155).  
 A post-gender world is, thus, a world without gender, in the idealistic sense that 
people do not become assimilated, marginalised, essentialised by their gender, or equally 
by their race or class. These categories are markers “forced on us by the terrible historical 
experience of the contradictory social realities of patriarchy, colonialism and capitalism” 
(Haraway 155). Instead, the post-gender will allow new possibilities of being, new 
affinities, and new kinships with machines and animals, represented in the cyborg and its 
‘monstrous’ nature. It is these monstrous selves so richly imagined in feminist science 
fiction that Haraway turns to for answers in our post-human times re-defining ourselves in 
relation to machines. Monsters, she continues, “have always defined the limits of 
community in Western imagination” giving the examples of Centaurs and Amazons of 
ancient Greece, or the un-separated twins and hermaphrodites of early modern France 
(180). The cyborg monsters in feminist science fiction offer new and different political 
possibilities in a more constructive light. The ultimate purpose of the Manifesto, declares 
Haraway, is “an argument for pleasure in the confusion of boundaries and for their 
responsibility in their construction” (150). 
 At this juncture, the question needs to be asked if Haraway is overly optimistic 
about her politically conscious cyborg in search of new hybridities of meanings while 
negotiating the informatics of domination. Undoubtedly, Haraway’s cyborg metaphor 
provides a complex understanding of the productive tensions in the relationship that 
humans have with the new machines, materially and ontologically. Without a doubt too, 
the cyborg metaphor through its boundary breakdown of disturbingly alive machines and 
frighteningly inert humans also provides an excellent account of the informatics of 
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domination that has witnessed more, and not less, politics, reinforced along fault lines of 
race, class, and gender. In this sense, the cyborg gives us our politics, which can be taken 
to refer to the politics in the informatics of domination.  To confront this politics, it will 
also be a cyborg but not any cyborg who is just an enhanced human-machine hybrid. It 
has to be Haraway’s cyborg with its feminist politics committed to “fundamental changes 
in the nature of class, race and gender” in the emerging world order mediated by new 
technologies. Ontologically the cyborg metaphor can help to question the categories of 
class, race, and gender as entrenched markers of identity, but how effective will it be in 
confronting the informatics of domination?  In order to answer this question, the thesis 
will like to bring in Paul Virilio and, briefly, Gillian Youngs. 
  
1.4   Living permanently in speed-space  
 While Haraway locates the origins of the new technology in the power structures 
of the military and patriarchal capitalism, Paul Virilio elaborates on this nexus of 
technology and military with his war theory and techno-speed criticism. For Virilio, 
everything starts in war and preparations for war, framing his war model of the modern 
city and of human society in general. He is well known for his study of speed in history, 
inventing the term, dromology, which essentially claims the logic of speed as the 
foundation of technological society. In his book, Speed and Politics, Virilio makes the 
renowned statement: “history progresses at the speed of its weapon systems” (68). Virilio 
observes that war-making technology has a logic of ever-increasing acceleration, which 
determines how the modern city has grown, and how human culture has evolved. The 
history of acceleration that began with transport, moving goods, people and troops, is 
today the quest itself, Virilio asserts, for the attainment of real time. But with technology 
breaking through the light barrier, after that of sound and heat, we now live in a light-
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speed era of real time. Virilio describes this condition of real time superseding real space 
as ‘speed-space’, a characteristic of dromocratic societies. “Today, almost all current 
technologies put the speed of light to work”, such that “the speed of light does not merely 
transform the world. It becomes the world.” (Virilio and Armitage, “Kosovo W@R” 
185). In another interview, Virilio elaborates:  
Information transmission is thus no longer concerned with the bringing 
about of a relative gain in velocity, as was the case with railway transport 
compared to horse power, or jet aircraft compared to trains, but about the 
absolute velocity of electromagnetic waves. (Virilio and Armitage, “From 
Modernism to Hypermodernism” 27).  
While Haraway critiques the disturbingly alive machines reducing the world and 
everything in it to quantifiable data and ‘a problem in coding’, Virilio critiques the 
technology of speed that has now deterritorialised real space taken over by real time. In 
Virilio’s ‘speed-space’, speed is no longer a mean to go somewhere but a milieu 
characterised by instantaneity, simultaneity, and ubiquity. In the same critical vein, Virilio 
rejects virtual reality, viewing it as the most insidious technology that the military world 
has bequeathed to consumer culture.  
 According to Virilio, virtual reality is a substitute for the real; so there are two 
realities today, one virtual and one real. New technologies are making virtual reality so 
powerful that Virilio fears it will take over actual reality. He decries, for example, the 
notion of cybersex as a technological replacement over human emotions.  For Virilio, the 
aesthetics of virtual reality hides its alienation from reality. While other art mediums use 
objects and aspects of life for depiction, virtual reality uses the whole of reality as its art, 
thus making the virtual a substitute to the actual. This rupture with reality makes virtual 
reality an accident of reality. For Virilio, using these new new tools becomes complicit in 
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their seduction by an aesthetics of disappearance so that the political nature of the tools 
becomes easily forgotten. To understand how this happens, Virilio’s accident theory of 
technology becomes pertinent. 
 Virilio observes that every time a technology is invented, an accident is invented 
together with it. For Virilio, the question should not be asked about whether we can do 
without technology; instead, the question of technology should be expanded “not only to 
the substance produced but also to the accident produced” (Virilio and Lotringer 46). For 
example, to invent the train is also to invent the potential of derailment, or to invent the 
aeroplane, there is the potential of the air crash. In other words, technology does not exist 
without the potential of its accompanying accident. “The riddle of technology”, he says, 
“is the riddle of the accident” (ibid 46). Virilio elaborates:  
As an art critic of technology, I always try to emphasize both the invention 
and the accident. But the occurrence of the accident is being denied. This 
is the result of the hype which always goes together with technical objects 
as with Bill Gates and cyberspace, for instance.  The hype in favour of 
technology dismisses its negative aspects. (Virilio and Armitage, “From 
Modernism to Hypermodernism” 32) 
For Virilio, war is the biggest accident of all. Here Virilio makes us reflect of how we 
tend to view technology only positively, even with war machines when they are actually 
machines of destruction with annihilation as their main objective. Of these war machines, 
Virilio states: “They are machines in reverse – they produce accidents, disappearances, 
deaths, breakdowns. I think war in this sense conveys something which at present we are 
experiencing in peacetime; the accident has now become something ordinary” (Virilio 
and Dercon 72). I understand Virilio here in two ways. Firstly, the relationship between 
technology and accident has become obscured, masking the catastrophic potential of 
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technology. In his dromological study, the speed achieved in our modern weaponry 
system also drives cultural and social development. Thus, if war is “the laboratory of 
speed”, then war has been “the laboratory of the future” (ibid 72). Many consumer 
technology like the video camera, mobile phones, virtual reality, and Global Positioning 
System, have their origins in military research. The technology of speed, thus, becomes 
part of the consumer landscape, and its war origins become imperceptible. The second 
point about the accident in technology is that when something becomes ordinary, we get 
used to its presence and become desensitised to its reality. If we recall Judy Wacjman’s 
statement of how we do not see the ‘power’ exercised by technical objects or technical 
systems, technical systems have become completely integrated into the social fabric, 
disappearing into the landscape.  
 There are two levels of desensitisation operating here for Virilio. The first is that 
wars today are increasingly fought not on the battlefields but through imaging machines. 
Virilio says, “[…] nowadays the tragedy of war is mediated through technology. It is no 
longer mediated through a human being with moral responsibilities” (Virilio and 
Armitage, “Kosovo W@R” 185). Cruise missiles deploy radar readings and pre-
programmed maps, as they follow their course towards their target. Missiles are flying 
cameras with “sightless vision”, that is, “vision without looking” (ibid 185). This is a 
vision without responsibility. The second level of desensitisation is how media, such as 
television, has become “a museum of accidents” (Armitage and Wilson, “Cyberwar, God 
and Television” 1), producing a distance from immediate reality. Watching war coverage 
on television, or a major disaster in our living room, is like visiting a museum show of 
accidents on display. Virilio declares: “Every technology, every science should choose its 
specific accident and reveal it as a product – not in a moralistic, protectionist way (safety 
first) but rather as a product to be ‘epistemo-technically’ questioned” (Virilio and 
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Lotringer 47). Ignoring the riddle of technology for Virilio puts us in a state of ‘pure war’, 
a state in which politics has disappeared, but of which we are not aware. This makes 
Virilio concerned with a kind of accident arising from the new technologies that we have 
not seen before. 
 The networked information processing systems have such power invested in them 
that it becomes increasingly difficult to pinpoint hierarchies of control and responsibility. 
These technologies of pure speed characterised by instantaneity, ubiquity, and 
simultaneity, he fears, will lead to the “integral and globally constituted accident” (Virilio 
and Armitage, “Kosovo W@R” 192). An example is the Wall Street crash in 1987 caused 
by systems failure in program trading when the automatic quotation of stock values 
accelerated and propagated the crash. The other example is the Asian financial crisis of 
1997 caused by foreign exchange speculation, the speed of which brought ruin overnight 
to many Asian economies. Instantaneous interactivity and the velocity at which 
information flows concern Virilio, because these areas are still not completely 
understood, nor can they be controlled completely. Virilio calls this the technological 
bomb or the information bomb, which is hard to predict or to control when there is a 
breakdown. The information bomb is something that happens simultaneously everywhere, 
“not localised as a specific accident, […] much like a bomb that goes off, but just that we 
don't even know what it is that went off” (Virilio and Lotringer 199). Such is the extent of 
Virilio’s distrust of the new machines and his critique provides added meaning to 
Haraway’s description of these machines as disturbingly alive.  
 Virilio’s techno-speed criticism is invaluable in dismantling the ideology of 
progress embedded in technology. The idea that technology brings progress automatically 
is often linked with the corresponding belief that progress also brings equality for all. But 
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the technology of speed that prevails in the informatics of domination has surfaced speed 
now as a source of capital and power. Virilio says:  
[…] the history of the world is not only about the political economy of 
riches, that is, wealth, money, capital, but also about the political economy 
of speed. If time is money, as they say, then speed is power. […] the 
higher speeds belong to the upper reaches of society, the slower to the 
bottom  (Virilio and Armitage, “From Modernism to Hypermodernism” 
26). 
For Virilio, it is no longer just about possessing wealth and riches but about possessing 
speed as a source of power, and this relates to Gillian Youngs’ argument about how speed 
is an agenda pushed by those that have the tools and who can benefit from this. 
 
1.5  The persistence of inequality  
 When Youngs examined the impact of technology on the global political 
economy, she differentiated the approach to technology as an exogenous factor (external 
to social processes or dynamics) or an endogenous factor (internal to social processes or 
dynamics), and adopted the latter in her analysis. Technology as an endogenous factor 
when introduced into existing set of social relations and processes, “will impact on them 
and evolve as part of them in anticipated and unanticipated, constructed and serendipitous 
ways” (“Global Political Economy” 3).  Her study reveals how new technology has 
become structurally relevant in the way power is attained and maintained in the globalised 
world order. Youngs finds evidence to show inequality deepening in complex ways 
within and across states, “signaling the threat that information age developments may 
further embed the inequities of the industrial age, particularly those related to socio-
economic and gender differences” (ibid 8). This conclusion concurs with Haraway’s 
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exposition of the growing inequalities in the informatics of domination. But Youngs uses 
a slightly different argument to explain the stubbornness of the inequalities entrenched by 
the advent of new technologies. Observing the extent of the inequalities across the world 
and within individual societies, the length of time that such inequalities have persisted, 
and the fact that many countries are getting worse not better, Youngs concludes that 
inequality is actually driving growth and development (ibid 93). She argues, “These 
benefits are so unevenly divided both between and within richer and poorer countries, that 
the overarching driver in the system could be argued to be inequality itself” (ibid 92). 
Hence, it is not technology per se that is driving growth and development, but inequality 
cloaked in the language of neo-liberalism that believes it is promoting equality and equal 
rights while achieving the opposite. This mismatch between the theory and practice of 
neo-liberalism makes Youngs highly critical of the active promotion of ICTs as 
development tools, because “they are yet another set of developments that allow the 
richer to further embed their advantages at all levels” (ibid 72).  The message of ICTs as 
the  “angel of hope” with its “universal vision of a digital future”, she believes, is “an 
agenda with a context and that context is the unequal world of contemporary 
globalization” (ibid 72). Youngs shows how technology has structurally maintained 
power structures in the globalised world order, recasting existing inequalities in new 
forms, while forging entirely new structures of inequality. The existing inequality based 
on gender was discussed earlier through the analogy of Haraway’s women in the 
integrated circuit. Similarly, Youngs asserts that ICTs carry the gendered legacy of 
historically established male dominance in the way science and technology develops, with 
women’s relationship to modern technologies largely defined and mediated by men 
(“Feminizing Cyberspace” 84). The world of ICTs for both Youngs and Haraway is more 
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gendered, but this inequality is not in the public eye because the historical pattern of 
gender relations to technology has always lain hidden from society. 
 A new structure of inequality that has emerged is the digital divide, presented now 
as a new form of inequality, but which actually is a reflection of existing socio-economic 
disparities. Youngs stresses, “the digital future is a highly unequal one” (“Global Political 
Economy” 105). Her reason being that if wealth is unequally distributed, a digital divide 
in ICTs will always exist, as the digital divide represents past and existing wealth divides. 
More fundamentally, the digital divide suggests how future divides in wealth may take 
shape, as ICTs increasingly determine the ability of individuals, firms, and nations to 
create future wealth. All statistics on the global digital divide show a widening disparity, 
mainly because the digital world does not stay static, and more powerful ICTs are being 
added to existing layers of inequality.13  In line with Virilio’s speed as a new source of 
capital and power, Youngs looks at the political economy of time and its startlingly 
implications for inequality. Youngs observes that the arrival of the web concretized this 
24-hour reality, providing “a virtual space within which trading, advertising, networking, 
information provision, online banking, etc., could literally go on non-stop around the 
clock” (ibid 67). The global financial market, an icon of the ICT era, has become an 
incessant arena of virtual exchange linking major cities round the word, while the 
majority of the world’s poorest, left out completely of the digital economy, are still living 
in starvation economies, governed by “pre-industrial agricultural season time” or 
“industrial era clock time” (ibid 67). Youngs asked what inequalities can be revealed in 
this hidden political economy of time whereby “the most privileged and developed areas 
                                                
13 Data and statistics which confirm the endurance of the digital divide can be found from reports 
by the various United Nations agencies, such as International Telecommunication Union’s “The 
World Information Society Report 2008” and United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development’s “The Digital Divide Report: ICT Diffusion Index 2005.” To arrive at her 
conclusions, Youngs uses data from the Human Development Reports published by United 
Nations Development Programme.  
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of the global economy are intensely locked into the experience and benefits of the new 
factors of speed”, while those “at the opposite end of the wealth and development 
spectrum are forced into a different temporal political economy” (ibid 68). She states: “It 
is clearly the richest economies and their corporations that are driving the speed agenda 
through infrastructural and technological developments, innovations in products and 
services, new working practices and forms of intensified consumption” (ibid 68). She 
believes that ICT development with all its potential and possibilities only serve to 
complicate further the pressing problems of global and local inequalities. ICTs in 
themselves are a source of inequality given the exponential gains to be made from the 
technological lead that the richest countries have over the poorest. This source of 
inequality resides in the ownership and control of varied forms of expert knowledge, 
scientific and technological, as well as applications of these forms of knowledge. Thus, 
technology has been become a tool of power to entrench existing privileges in a world 
that espouses equality but is witnessing greater socio-economic disparities. 
 
1.6 To be a cyborg or not to be … 
 Haraway’s cyborg metaphor has offered an invaluable framework to interrogate 
the cyborgisation processes at work today given that modern ICTs are everywhere and 
invisible. Haraway sees much to learn from our fusions with the animal and machine 
worlds, while accepting the ontological status of the cyborg in its human-machine 
hybridity. However, she is also aware that the machines are disturbingly alive while 
humans are passive and inert, thus allowing the technical to take over the human element, 
heralding in the informatics of domination. Virilio, on the other hand, is more critical of 
the power inherent in technology through his techno-speed critique. He sees a growing 
contraction of human control over machines, and the technical qualities of war and speed 
43 
 
diminishing the arena of the political. Youngs observes that ICTs are being used as a tool 
to promote equality but delivering inequality. Ultimately, the three writers intersect in 
being sceptical of the ideology of progress embedded in technology, and all arrive at the 
same conclusion-that new technologies are themselves fraught with more politics of 
inequalities while reinforcing traditional power hierarchies. But I do not see the three 
writers, certainly not Haraway, rejecting technology outright. They are critical but they 
are not the Luddites of today’s cyborgian technologies. Virilio comes close to being 
labelled as one, providing the most scathing critique of the three and disapproving many 
developments in new technology, such as virtual reality. But even with Virilio, I see grave 
concern, even strong censure, but not outright rejection. His position is to epistemo-
technically question every technological product to reveal the accident in the technology, 
and not just focus on the hype of what it can achieve. For Youngs, she surfaces the 
driving force in the economic system, that of inequality, and is highly critical of the 
contradictions between the message of empowerment and equality behind ICTs, and the 
resulting outcome, which shows the opposite.  
 Of the three, Haraway takes a more hopeful position through her cyborg in 
working productively with technology. Ontologically, the cyborg provides the hybrid 
metaphor to work against any totalising tendency for ‘an essential unity’ as this will help 
to survive the diasporas, particularly, for women in the integrated circuit. She is aware the 
cyborg is not innocent, but to reject its status is not possible as there is no going back, 
“ideologically or materially” (162). Haraway finds herself in an ironic situation borne of 
her time but sees hope there; she has a PhD in biology “made possible by Sputnik’s 
impact on US national science-education policy” while being strongly influenced by the 
women’s movement (173). This irony explains her strategic position towards technology. 
In clinging on to irony, she is saying, one does not have to give up hope, because “irony is 
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about contradictions that do not resolve into larger wholes, even dialectically, about the 
tension of holding incompatible things together because both of all are necessary and 
true” (149). In irony, is found “a rhetorical strategy and a political method” (Haraway 
149). At the start of the thesis, it was stated that cyborgisation is an inevitable fact of 
modern societies, given the ubiquity and pervasiveness of ICTs. Total disavowal of the 
new technologies is not possible, and if that is the case, then irony may be the best 
approach to confront the oppression in the informatics of domination enveloping modern 
societies today. What is important is not to identify uncritically with the message of 
empowerment sold with every new development in technology, but to adopt Virilio’s 
epistemo-technical questioning, while being consciously aware that technology benefits 
some bodies more than others. In that respect, it becomes ethically possible to embrace a 
politics of hope in Haraway’s cyborg, ontologically and politically, for working towards 
“fundamental changes in the nature of class, race, and gender” in the emerging world 
order increasingly mediated by new technologies.  
 Some advice also emerges from Haraway’s adoption of Chela Sandoval’s 
oppositional consciousness, a strategy ascribed to ‘women of colour’ who are able to read 
the webs of power in the American system of oppression where they have been thrice 
discriminated for their colour, class, and gender, and have thrice triumphed over them. 
Sandoval’s ‘women of colour’ has become a metaphor for the lessons from the history of 
the struggle of black women in the US, respected by Haraway, especially for the literacy 
acquired at great peril to their lives, “risking death to learn and to teach reading and 
writing” (175).  The ability to write determines who has power if we look at history itself  
- who writes it and whose stories are told. To be a cyborg, one must be aware of this 
power of writing. As Haraway says: “Cyborg writing is about the power to survive, not on 
the basis of original innocence, but on the basis of seizing the tools to mark the world that 
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marked them as other” (175). I quote Haraway, ten years after the Cyborg Manifesto, for 
a reminder:  
The global and universal are not pre-existing empirical qualities; they are 
deeply fraught, dangerous and inescapable inventions. (np) The cyborg is a 
figure for exploring those inventions, whom they serve, how they are can 
be reconfigured. Cyborgs do not stay still. Already in the few decades that 
they have existed, they have mutated, in fact and fiction, into second-order 
entities like genomic and electronic databases and the other denizens of the 
zone called cyberspace. Lives are at stake in curious quasi-objects like 
databases [...].  (“Foreword: Cyborgs and Symbionts” xix) 
Haraway’s cyborg opens up complex and critical ways to look at the productive tensions 
between the technological and the human, while at the same providing a strategic 
positioning in responding to the informatics of domination. We will next explore what 














  Chapter Two 
  Becoming cyborg in iN2015  
 
 When the 10-year infocomm plan was launched in June 2006, the press release 
proudly declared, “Singapore iN2015 master plan offers a digital future for everyone” 
(IDA Press release 20 June 2006). IDA was keen to convey the impression that the master 
plan was not just their brainchild, but a ‘private, public and people sector co-creation’ 
resulting from many discussions with stakeholders and focus groups. The iN2015 master 
plan came a year and three months after the Infocomm Technology Roadmap 5 report 
was launched at a symposium in March 2005 attended mainly by industry players, 
business leaders, and IT professionals. Ten sub-committees, three focus groups, and two 
working committees were set up, with members selected by IDA to discuss Singapore’s 
technological direction based on the ITR5 report.14  The public, albeit mainly school 
children, was engaged through the Express IT iN2015 competition to draw ideas on how 
they imagined IT would impact the future in 2015. The iN2015 report was the 
culmination of all these activities; its final summary formed Singapore’s fifth and latest 
ICT policy released in June 2006 by the iN2015 Steering Committee.15 While iN2015 is 
an economic blueprint with concrete goals set for the infocomm industry and its usage 
(see page 8), it is also a futurological policy document projective of desires for an 
idealised future. A constant refrain running throughout the report is how our lives will be 
enriched and enhanced with new technology. How iN2015 envisage lives becoming 
richer and more meaningful will be reflective of its aspirations for the techno future. With 
                                                
14 These committees and the members can be found in Annex C of its report, p.123-143. 
  
15 The iN2015 report comprise seven reports focusing on key economic sectors and three reports 
on how the infocomm industry can be grown and how infocomm could support the needs of the 




the cyborg future planned for everyone, what does it mean to become a cyborg in 
iN2015’s brave new world ahead of us? What are the desires of the iN2015 cyborg based 
on? One way in finding out is to examine the use of language, metaphors, and imagery of 
how the techno future is marketed. Two IDA marketing videos, both available online and 
even promoted on YouTube, have been produced to market the iN2015 future. The first, 
titled “iN2015<Imagine Your World”, was produced in 2006, and I will refer to this as 
the iN2015 video. The second video titled, “Next Generation National Broadband 
Network”, made in 2008, was released with IDA’s 2007/08 Annual Report, and I will 
refer to this as the Next Gen video. We look at the narratives in these videos to see how 
individual bodies, and whose bodies, are ‘enriched’ and ‘enhanced’ in intelligent nation 
Singapore. To analyse the ontology and politics of new technology under iN2015, the 
Singapore situation will now be foregrounded with references to other scholars for their 
writings on Singapore.  
 
2.1  Imagining the cyborg future in iN2015 
 We begin with the iN2015 video. The protagonists are a normative middle-class 
Chinese family consisting of three generations, parents, two children, and a grandparent. 
The story is one day in their lives, which happens to be mum’s birthday. Mum is Nancy, a 
digital animator, and she is seen at work, in a power-suit, video conferencing with her 
international non-English speaking clients. As each client speak, she/he is being 
simultaneously translated into Nancy’s earpiece. When the videoconference is over, 
Nancy whips up her wristwatch that becomes a Next Gen mobile device and emails a 
message to order a taxi for son, David, to be picked up from the zoo. Sazali, a male Malay 
taxi driver, receives her instructions on his Next Gen mobile computer.  Next, we meet 
Tobey, a male Caucasian expatriate executive, newly arrived in Singapore, at his new 
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apartment, unpacking. He is speaking to dad who is called Mark, a logistics manager. 
Together, they discuss work, communicating wirelessly through Tobey’s Next Gen 
sunglasses and Mark’s Next Gen car front window screen that acts as a computer screen. 
When they finish, Tobey calls up his avatar on his Next Gen sunglasses. She is an alluring 
Chinese female, his personal secretary, who attends to his work and personal schedule. 
She updates him on his favourite show playing at the Esplanade, and books tickets for 
him. Cut to Mark navigating in town looking for a parking lot. Suddenly, an email 
message flashes on his car front window computer. It’s Tobey inviting him for the 
Esplanade show. Cut to son David who’s at the zoo, busy snapping pictures of the 
animals with his Next Gen computer. Mid-day, he emails his professor with a question 
about rhinoceros, and the professor immediately shows up on David’s screen with an 
answer. Cut to daughter Karen introduced as a teenage consumer, shopping for mum’s 
birthday present. She carries a Next Gen device that flashes out the discounts on offer in 
the shopping mall and directs her to the specific counter. Cut to grandmother Lee 
exercising at home. Her heart skips a little too fast and it triggers an alert on her wristband 
device to her doctor who immediately appears on its screen to attend to her. Before the 
happy day ends, the family gathers for the evening meal, celebrating mum’s birthday. 
Presents are offered, and the son surprises everybody with his immersive virtual reality 
projection in the living room of the zoo scenes shot that very afternoon. 
 The iN2015 video shows everyone using a Next Gen device that enhances their 
everyday experience, whether it is work, learning, at play, exercising, or shopping. 
Everything works effortlessly, and everyone is totally at ease using the futuristic devices 
that are gossamer light, nearly invisible, and worn or used close to the body. Seamless 
connectivity and interactivity also exist between all these Next Gen devices that talk to 
each other without any glitches. We see expatriate Tobey walking around in his new 
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compartment in his dark computer screen glasses, not bumping into things, while having 
an online video conversation, all at the same time. Dad Mark drives around town 
effortlessly while he uses his front car window as an interactive computer screen. 
Grandma’s health can be monitored 24 hours round the clock via her wristband device, 
suggesting a doctor on call, anywhere and anytime. Shopping for the teenage daughter is 
totally stress-free, facilitated by technology. The iN2015 future is, unquestionably, a 
technotopia: a flawless technical world, behaving perfectly at the command of humans 
who are fully in control and at ease using technology. It disregards the real world of 
technology where hitches and glitches happen, protocols and standards between operating 
devices are different, let alone different generational models of technology that keep 
changing, impeding the smooth and seamless connectivity that is marketed in the videos 
 If a cyborg is a human being enhanced in some way by new technology, we see 
the iN2015 cyborg in the video as a media savvy consumer and user of new technology. 
Apart from the consumption of technological tools, identities and social relations in the 
future of 2015 remain totally unchanged. The three-generation middle-class Chinese 
family and the Caucasian expatriate are seen using all manner of Next Gen gadgets. The 
other non-Chinese is Malay and he is a taxi driver. Both husband and wife work, but it is 
wife who attends to son’s schedule. Reinforcing yet another gender stereotype, 
technology for females is about enhancing the shopping experience, as seen with the 
teenage consumer daughter. iN2015 views technology empowering men differently from 
women, further confirmed in the scene of the Caucasian expatriate with his attractive 
Chinese female secretary transformed into a virtual reality persona. She does not have a 
name and answers to his command of ‘avatar’. The woman here is presented as a 
technical object to fulfil male fantasies, and if this is not already offensive, it is made 
worse playing up the Orientalist trope of the exotic East (its women) for the colonising 
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white men. There is a double image of empowerment for the man (and disempowerment 
for the woman) based on race and gender. That this colonial trope has been adopted for 
the brave new world of iN2015 and endorsed in a government video made available on 
the world wide web, only demonstrates the unconscious internalisation of, and therefore, 
more insidious adherence to, patriarchal values. From the iN2015 video, it is clearly 
shown that new technology enhances bodies differently; some bodies more than others, 
with the class, race, and gender tropes continuing to hold sway. We look next at the Next 
Gen Broadband video, produced two years later, in 2008, to see if the narratives have 
changed.  
 In this Next Gen Broadband video, the protagonists are again a normative middle 
class Chinese family of three generations – the parents, one son, and grandfather. There is 
a twist to the profile of the couple. This time, Jack, the husband works as a 3-D animator. 
He is wheelchair bound from an accident, but this has not deterred him from leading a 
fruitful and meaningful life, he cheerfully declares. Happily married, beautiful wife, 
lovely kid, a successful career and a member of the Para-Olympics national team, he asks 
proudly: ‘What else can I ask for?’  Cut to grandfather Tan who has a serious diabetes 
problem. While watching TV, Tan is reminded by a message on screen that it is time for 
his weekly check-up with his doctor. He checks in with his doctor, and we witness 
telemedicine in action with the doctor examining his tongue in real time through an 
Internet video exchange. Then Tan goes out to lunch with friend Murthy. At the 
restaurant, they are served immediately on arrival because Tan had earlier ordered their 
food by email. Meanwhile, beautiful wife of Jack, a homemaker, is out shopping in a 
shoppers’ paradise. Instead of having to walk the whole of Orchard Road, she can call up 
items virtually from any shop and superimpose these on her image in a shop’s computer 
mirror screen. While wife is shopping, Jack is busy at work at home. He communicates 
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online with free-lance female IT expert, Raini, who tells us that she has since returned to 
work after staying home to take care of her third child. Cut to Jack’s wife (she has not 
been given a name), back home, house-hunting virtually at the computer. She 
communicates online with Siti, a real estate agent cum stay-at-home mum. Siti is also 
happily cleaning window and ironing clothes at home. She thinks aloud of the wonders of 
broadband connectivity taking her places without leaving home and allowing her to be a 
full-time mum. Cut to David downloading his finished project swiftly meeting a client’s 
urgent deadline ahead of schedule. He exclaims: “With such support and technology, I 
feel that I have swapped my wheelchair for wings!”  
 The purpose of the Next Gen video is, obviously, to show how lives are enhanced 
with high speed broadband when huge quantities of data can be transmitted over Internet. 
We can work easily from home, visit the doctor virtually, shop stress-free, order our food 
ahead of our arrival at the restaurant, go house-hunting online, and obtain whatever 
information – text and video data - anytime and anywhere. This Next Gen video, as in the 
iN2015 video, sends out a similar message: infocomm brings great ease and convenience, 
as we become media savvy users and consumers of new technologies living our lives 
virtually.  As in the iN2015 video, technology works flawlessly and seamlessly. In terms 
of narratives on social reality, many themes from the iN2015 video are replayed, but on 
gender roles, the stereotypical portrayal of males and females in the technology landscape 
has regressed. Jack’s wife has the luxury of not working and spends the day shopping, 
compared to Siti and Raini (are these non-Chinese women also single parents, we 
wonder?). Work culture is represented showing that when men work, they only have 
work, whereas if women work, they also have to cope with both family and domestic 
matters. In this video, Siti, the real estate agent, works from home, plays mum, irons and 
cleans house. Raini, an IT professional, re-enters the workforce, but only after taking time 
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to look after her third child. Technology clearly means different things to the different 
genders. Technology for women allows her to work from home (if she has to work) but 
mainly to support her role as mother and homemaker, whereas technology for men is 
about empowerment and enhancing capabilities. When iN2015 proclaims that infocomm 
drives limitless possibilities “to help us become creative and to enjoy life” (iN2015 34), 
we wonder who are the ones who can be creative and enjoy life. Jack’s wife shops and 
house-hunts on the internet, while Siti and Raini work from home and cope with 
housework and children; scenarios sadly replicating the traditional sexual division of 
labour in the brave new world to be of 2015. In both videos, female identity has been 
further essentialised as die-hard shoppers shopping for cosmetics and clothes. Whereas 
with David, technology empowers on three levels: it provides for a profession as a digital 
animator; it allows for working from home; and it facilitates an active sporting life. 
Technology does not just help David to cope with his disability; it truly enhances his 
capabilities to lead a productive and meaningful life. Technology for men empowers in 
Amartya Sen’s sense of enhancing an individual’s capabilities with the positive freedoms 
to be or do something.16 Why isn’t the same imagined for women? This contradicts the 
report when it proudly declares: “By removing the tedium of routine work, for example, 
people will have more time to dream up the new and different” (iN2015 34).  In the two 
videos, the sexual division of labour that penalises working mothers, the comfortable 
beneficence of pro-family conservatism, technology empowering the already privileged, 
and sexy female avatars fulfilling male fantasies, are all issues of class, race, and gender, 
                                                
16 In his book, Development as Freedom, Sen develops his concept of positive and negative 
freedoms. Positive freedoms are substantial freedoms that are real opportunities to pursue 
personal and social goals. Negative freedoms are non-interference rights that can be summed up 
as freedom from coercion, such as freedom from murder, rape, enslavement or kidnapping. The 
examples in the videos show that technology for women can be viewed as kind of negative 
freedom in the sense that they have freedom to work from home but they continue to have to look 
after children and the house, whereas the men have positive freedoms provided by the new 




which persist and are entrenched in the iN2015 vision. Technotopia is meant for some 
cyborg bodies based on class, race and gender differences, more than for others. 
 In iN2015, cyborgian technologies enhancing lives mean citizens are obliged to be 
media savvy users and consumers of Next Gen devices to cope with living in smart 
sentient spaces, that is, if they can afford the high tech homes and their devices in the first 
place. When the Media Development Authority (MDA), an agency of IDA, the 
government agency tasked to implement the iN2015 mission, organised the inaugural 
Media Fiesta in March 2009, it was part of the government’s efforts to “promote media 
literacy and cyberwellness in an age when Singaporeans have more quality content 
choices than before” (Singapore Media Fusion e-newsletter. Issue 23: 26). Held at a 
downtown shopping centre, the main events consisted of introducing the latest video 
games, animation features, and made-in-Singapore TV shows; hands-on trials at 
interactive sites such as the national newspaper youth website STOMP; and an exhibition 
that explained film content classification and the key role played by the community in 
regulation. We are reminded of the vision of iN2015 – to give “every individual and 
endeavour seamless access to intelligent technology – and with it – the capability to take 
charge” described as “the new freedom to connect, innovate, personalise and create” 
(IDA website). According to MDA’s Media Fiesta, media literacy can be summed up as: 
keeping abreast on the media scene for the latest video game or a locally produced TV 
show funded by MDA; deepening the consumer experience of interactive digital media; 
and understanding government’s rationale for censorship and classification.  The need to 
be media literate is, thus, driven primarily by consumption needs, while keeping within 
the bounds of societal and governmental regulations. 
 In the cyborg future of 2015, it would seem that lives are enriched and enhanced 
as media savvy consumers of technology, living lives with more ease and convenience, 
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while identities and social relations based on class, race, and gender remain unchanged. 
Clearly, the iN2015 cyborg is one-dimensional with its empowerment purely driven by 
consumption, making it primarily a media savvy user and consumer of new technologies. 
In contrast, Haraway’s cyborg strives for a post-gender world, which moves away from 
gender, race, and class as a basis for establishing essential unity. In other words, 
ontologically and politically, in Haraway’s post-gender world, people are not assimilated, 
compartmentalised, marginalised, or essentialised by their gender, race, class, even 
sexuality, or nation. These categories, she reminds us, have been forced on countries, 
peoples and individuals, “by the terrible historical experience of the contradictory social 
realities of patriarchy, colonialism and capitalism” (155). In the informatics of domination 
of present times, these categories have not disappeared but have been glossed over by the 
veneer of the empowerment message in technology or, as Youngs highlighted, the 
ideology of progress embedded in technology. When peoples and worlds are reduced to 
become information processing units, socio-political problems also become translated as 
‘quantifiable data’ and ‘problems in coding’. iN2015 has bought completely into 
technotopia and the ideology of technology as progress in Singapore’s pro-business, pro-
consumer environment, but the island-state is not inoculated from the negative fall-out of 
the intense cyborgisation processes that Haraway, Virilio and Youngs speak about. The 
thesis would now like to discuss two particular issues in this negative fall-out of the 
cyborgisation process that undermine the iN2015 vision of a digital future for everyone. 
The first deals with gender and the other with inequality. 
  
2.2  The gendering of iN2015 
 The cyborgian future imagined in 2015 in the IDA videos is frightfully gendered 
where the binary relations of gender identities are reinforced. When it first appeared, 
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Haraway’s cyborg was seized by feminists as a new way for rethinking the body because 
it shook the biologically deterministic formulation of being female. How much has her 
cyborg changed the world, particularly, of the structured social relations of science and 
technology, which the cyborg was then addressing? In an interview twenty years after the 
Manifesto, Haraway admitted that the world has become “ferociously gender-in-place” 
(Gane 137), a description that also applies to the iN2015 scenarios in the IDA videos. 
Technology and gender as a subject has a long and vast history that is beyond the scope of 
this thesis. Instead, the thesis will confine the discussion mainly to statistical evidence of 
the relationship between technology and gender in Singapore to see what it reveals. First, 
we need a preamble to frame why gender is a crucial issue with regards to the increasing 
use of ICTs in Singapore.   
 When we see all the Next Gen gadgets and new technology featured in the videos, 
such as the wearable computing devices and the use of smart sentient technologies, the 
question of who decides, who researches, who designs, who engineers, looms large. A 
report from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in its work on women 
empowerment in developing countries helps to explain why this question is important. 
The United Nations rank ICT as the third most important issue facing women globally, 
after poverty and violence, and gender as a major factor in determining who has access to 
and who benefits from ICT. It reports many barriers to women’s access to ICTs, pointing 
out that the ICT industry is uniquely male, women are disproportionately represented 
among the information poor, and women are “nearly absent as substantive producers of 
technology or content, much less as decision makers” (para 4).17 The UNDP concludes 
                                                
17The United Nations Development Programme, in its work on women empowerment, adopts the 
strategy of gender mainstreaming, which is to effect changes in mainstream policies and resource 
allocation reflecting the interests and views of women as well as men. The major lesson learnt 
from the slow progress in achieving real change in the situation of women despite efforts over two 
decades is that significant change cannot be achieved by adding marginal programmes for 
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that to see technology as gender-neutral entrenches inequality, which enlarges the gender 
gap making ICTs actually ‘gender-negative’. Where does Singapore of first world status 
fit into this general description of technology and the gender gap that prevails in 
developing countries? We look now at some of Singapore’s statistics. 
 From the latest statistics for the period of 2002 to 2006, females make up 
generally half the number of males enrolling and graduating in information computing 
courses at tertiary level (see Chart 1 on page iv). This same ratio persists in employment. 
From 2005 to 2008, females persistently make up only half the male workforce in the 
infocomm industry (see Chart 2 on page v). When we look at occupation and decision-
making positions in the IT world, the gender picture becomes even more skewed. While 
females have nearly caught up with males as technicians or associate professionals, 
females lag behind the males more than twice the number as managers or senior officials, 
working proprietors and professionals, while a large proportion of females work as 
clerical staff.18  Considering that Singapore’s ICT plans were rolled out as early as 1981, 
early enough to get more women into this field by the 21st century, the statistics show a 
stubbornly male dominated ICT world. The information age has been expected to benefit 
women because the ICT world does not require the application of physical labour and 
strength. So why are we not seeing a more balanced gender representation in the ICT 
world?   
                                                                                                                                            
women. Work on gender mainstreaming in developing countries can be found on the UNDP 
website under the link on women’s empowerment.  
 
18 These figures were compiled from the gender disaggregated data for employed residents in 
Information and Communications distributed by occupations from the 2007 Labour Force Survey, 
submitted in “Singapore’s Fourth Periodic Report to the UN Committee for the Convention on the 
Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women. November 2008.” by the Ministry of 
Community Development, Youth and Sports. Table 40 contains the relevant data and is 




  Singapore acceded to the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) in October 1995. This legally binds 
Singapore to implement the provisions of the Convention. Singapore, through the 
Ministry of Community Development, Youth and Sports, is committed to submit national 
reports at least every four years on measures taken to comply with their treaty obligations. 
Since 2000, four reports have been submitted, with the latest in November 2008. In this 
2008 report, ICTs have been mentioned but only under the article on education detailing 
Singapore’s ICT master plan for primary and secondary schools. No gender related 
concerns with ICT were raised. It is, thus, not far-fetched to say that technology in 
Singapore is viewed as gender-neutral, which actually means being gender-blind to the 
inequalities embedded in technology. 
  The gendering of technology in Singapore is further complicated by the 
fact that conscription called National Service is compulsory for men and not women. 
Implemented in 1967, all male Singapore citizens and second-generation permanent 
residents upon reaching the age of 18 have to serve two years as full time National 
Servicemen mainly in the Singapore Armed Forces. After these two years, the men 
continue their training annually for a shorter stint until the age of 40 or 50 depending on 
their rank. The Singapore Armed Forces has been transforming itself and training its 
servicemen to become the Third-Generation (3G) force, tapping on ICTs to turn into a 
network-centric and knowledge-based fighting power.  Such experience keeps men 
anchored in the world of technology. The subject of conscription for women was raised 
on many occasions, notably by the Association of Women for Action and Research 
(AWARE)19, but the government’s response has always remained the same: Singapore 
                                                
19 AWARE is Singapore’s only feminist organisation formed in 1985 as a women’s rights 
advocacy group. 
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society is too conservative to accept such a drastic social change. National conscription 
will continue to foster women’s exclusion from the world of technology that is essentially 
a male and masculinist domain in Singapore. So how can change take place?  
 If we look at the Singapore situation, women’s access to education and economic 
opportunities is the envy of many countries in the region, and many have succeeded in 
careers of their choice. While many individual women have broken through the proverbial 
glass ceiling in their fields, the statistics tell something else about the big picture. The 
World Economic Forum (WEF) tracks a gender gap index, where the value of 1 indicates 
full equality between men and women, and 0 means total inequality. Its Global Gender 
Gap Report 2009, released in October, saw Singapore registering a marginal improvement 
in its score that climbed to 0.666. But this is no consolation considering Singapore’s 
ranking at 85 out of the 134 countries. Last year’s was 84. In these two years, Singapore’s 
ranking has worsened quite significantly compared to 2007 (77th position) and 2006 
(65th). Tackling the gender imbalance in Singapore is not helped when women themselves 
have found class equality with the men through education and employment, and become 
gender-insensitive.  When the first woman permanent secretary, Ms Lim Soo Hoon, was 
promoted in 2000, she made it clear she was no feminist and that her career was “ample 
proof of her own conviction that there is no glass ceiling for women in the civil 
service.”20  The counter question that should be posed is: why has it then taken so long to 
promote a woman to run a ministry? In March 2009, the first woman minister was 
appointed in Mrs Lim Hwee Hua. The Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong, in announcing 
the promotion, commented on the gender imbalance in politics, saying: “It’s just the way 
                                                




things turn out, particularly in politics, that there are more men than women.”21  A similar 
reply is most likely expected to explain the persistent gender imbalance in IT education or 
employment. Mrs Lim also made it clear who should be given the credit for the greater 
female representation in Parliament. She said: “It is really through the vision of the men 
who were in charge […] Most of us came through because we were identified by the 
leaders who were men.”22 If women leaders cannot see the gendered socio-political 
world, then any likely change will only come from the men in power. In the patriarchal 
state of Singapore, this change will not come fast. Christine Doran and Jim Jose highlight 
the contradiction in the position taken by Singapore’s PAP government that rejects 
feminism because it is a western import. On the one hand, the government “supports 
wholesale adoption of western economic thought, business practices and consumer 
culture”, and I must now add, modern ICTs, but on the other hand, “when it comes to 
dealing with women’s issues, any idea that might threaten men’s power is deemed to be 
un-Singaporean, and the PAP suddenly finds value in the ‘local’ rather than the ‘global’, 
the ‘authentic’ rather than the ‘imported’, the ‘traditional’ rather than the ‘modern’” 
(Doran and Jose 227). The gender issue is, of course, related to another issue that seems 
to be worsening in our cyborgian times and, that is, the persistence of inequality. 
 
2.3  The statistic that is here to stay  
 In an international cross-country comparison over 1990 to 2000, the four ‘tiger’ 
economies and the United States showed a widening disparity in overall household 
income (see Chart 3 on page vi). Looking at Singapore’s situation taken from the 2000 
                                                
21 Kian Beng Kor, “Lim Hwee Hua Promoted on Merit, Not Because of Gender.” Straits Times 31 
Mar 2009.  
 




study23 by the Department of Statistics, its Gini coefficient24 rose steadily from 1990 to 
2000 (see Table 1 on page vii). In this same study, the other measures of income 
inequality also confirm the growing disparity in household income. Economists prefer to 
use the top and bottom 20% of the average income of households for a less skewed 
picture of income distribution than the 10% top and bottom figures. If we look at the ratio 
of the household income in the top 20% to that in the lowest 20% in Table 1, the ratio 
rose from 11.4 in 1990 to over 20.9 in 2000. If we look at income share, the earnings of 
the top 20% rose from 48.1% in 1990 to 51% in 2000, while that of the bottom 20% 
dropped from 4.2 to 2.4%.  During this period 1990-2000, the much faster income growth 
for high-income earners has, thus, been accompanied by rising income disparity. This 
study attributes the widening disparity in Singapore to the transition to a knowledge-
based economy, observing the same phenomenon in Hong Kong, South Korea, Taiwan 
and United States (6). More recent data continue to report the same trend of greater 
income disparity (see Table 2 on page vii). In this second table, the Gini coefficient rose 
from 2000 to 2007 and decreased slightly in 2008, but when 2000 (0.444) is compared to 
2008 (0.489), the Gini index shows an overall worsening trend. From this report, the ratio 
of the average income of the top 20% to the bottom 20% shows a 10 times earning 
capacity in 2000 increasing to 13 times in 2008. 
 The digital divide has been discussed as a reflection of existing socio-economic 
disparities, with Youngs asserting that the digital future is a highly unequal one. The 
                                                
23 This study titled “Income Distribution and Inequality Measures in Singapore” was presented at the 
Chinese Populations and Socioeconomic Studies: Utilizing the 2000/2001 round Census Data conference. 
Held at Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, 19-21 June 2002.   
 
24 The Gini coefficient measures the income distribution, and is often used as a gauge of the 
income gap for comparison over time. It takes a value between 0 and 1; with 0 showing perfect 
equality where everyone has the same income, and 1 as perfect inequality where only one person 
has all the income and everyone else has zero income. If the Gini coefficient rises over time, it 




digital divide often refers to inequalities in access and affordability to ICTs, such as the 
Internet, personal computers, and cell phones. iN2015 views infocomm as a “powerful 
leveller to build a digitally inclusive society and enrich all lives” (iN2015 101). It actually 
believes it is possible to close the digital divide and to ensure that no one is left out, the 
elderly, the disabled, and the needy, have been identified as target groups to educate, 
train, and help with subsidies. Inspite of its good intentions, such an outlook fails to see 
that ICTs introduced in an unequal world could themselves be reinforcing existing 
inequalities while introducing new inequalities. Granted, more and more Singaporeans 
now own computers and are getting connected and at faster speeds as the island gets 
wired up under the nation-wide fibre optic infrastructure. But the discussion of the digital 
divide has now moved from inequalities in basic ‘quantity’ and access to ICTs to 
differences in the quality of the user experience. Youngs highlights that the digital divide, 
more fundamentally, suggests how future divides in wealth may take shape, as ICTs 
increasingly determine the ability of individuals, firms, and nations to create future 
wealth. Randolph Kluver observes that while the digital divide in Singapore has some 
ethnic and socio-economic dimensions, it is not a question of access but rather about 
values. He states: “[…] any Singaporean who wants to go online has little difficulty in 
doing so. What divide that does exist is primarily attitudinal, in that large numbers of the 
lower educated, the elderly and lower socio-economic groupings see no real value to go 
online” (43). Tackling the accessibility issues might solve a quantitative aspect of the 
digital divide but hides a crucial dimension in terms of its qualitative experience. There is 
a big difference between using the Internet to keep in touch and using it for generating 
business opportunities and social networking. Believing that ICTs could be a leveller of 
inequalities may end up ignoring why not everyone wants to be connected, as observed by 
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Kluver, or what being connected really means in qualitative terms for each and every 
person.  
 In a high-tech economy of iN2015, lowly positions handling data entry and 
processing tend to be fulfilled by women. In the IDA videos, the cyborgian labouring 
body, such as the women in the integrated circuit, is conspicuously absent. iN2015 
proudly celebrates the concept of “Infocomm Unlimited” so that we can become “more 
creative and to enjoy life” (34). But who will be working in the microelectronic factories, 
or doing the manual and routine work that are not technologically skilled, but which keep 
the economy and the society functioning. During the 2009 economic downturn in 
Singapore, lowly-educated women, in their 50’s, seeking jobs as cleaners, were asked to 
email their resume to a recruitment database repository.25  The situation makes a mockery 
of poor, uneducated women who have neither the resources, nor the need for IT skills in 
their lowly paid jobs. The move to get everyone connected and IT-savvy ends up 
penalising these older, lowly educated, and poor women (and men). We are thus 
reminded of Haraway’s feminization of poverty in the homework economy, that one can 
be employed and still poor.  
 With global inequalities persisting, Youngs has argued there is now enough 
evidence to demonstrate that it is inequality that is actually driving growth and 
development. The conventional wisdom on economic growth and inequality belongs to 
the school of trickle down development. According to this school, “the vertical flow from 
the rich would happen of its own accord” (Kakwani and Pernia 2). The rationale is that 
the rich will benefit from the first round of economic growth, and when they begin to 
spend their gains, this generates the second round of growth that will then benefit the 
poor. In other words, the poor will benefit from economic growth indirectly as a vertical 
                                                
25 Serene Luo, “Wiring the Blue-Collar Workers for the IT World,” Straits Times 7 July 2009. 
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flow from the rich, even if they benefit proportionally less than the rich. Proponents of 
trickle down development believe that poverty will diminish with growth even if the poor 
receives a small proportion of total benefits (ibid 2). The trickle down development 
argument has been seductively persuasive, given the examples of Singapore and the other 
Asian tigers, Hong Kong, South Korea, and Taiwan. These Asian tigers have stunned the 
world with their high and sustained economic growth over four decades to emerge as 
advanced and high-income economies in the 21st Century. The concentration of income at 
the top is actually seen as a spur to improving living standards. The arguments have been 
succinctly summarised by economics writer John Ravenhill. On one side of the argument, 
"inequality provides incentives for effort and risk-taking, and therefore spurs efficiency 
and productivity, the gains from which will trickle down. […] So those who worry about 
inequality are just practising the 'politics of envy'” (Ravenill 401). The other side of the 
argument refutes the conventional wisdom of considering ‘efficiency’ and ‘distribution’ 
separately and argue that policy recommendations should not be based entirely on 
efficiency (ibid 401). Weighing up the two opposing viewpoints, Ravenhill concludes, 
"most economists are not much bothered about income inequality provided markets are 
free, because they buy into the belief about inequality as the main source of incentives" 
(401).  
 Singapore’s development model is clearly premised on the trickle down theory. Its 
economic growth continues to impress, but inequality statistics have stubbornly persisted. 
The United Nation Development Programme has been tracking members’ socio-economic 
development since 1980 through the Human Development Index and compiling the 
results in their Human Development Report since 1990.26  Singapore’s HDI has been 
                                                
26 The Human Development Index (HDI) is a composite measurement of three dimensions of 
human development: life expectancy, literacy and educational attainment, and GDP per capita - 
taking values between 0 and 1. The three dimensions of the Human Development Index are: 
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improving since 1990, and the latest Human Development Report 2009 ranks Singapore 
in 23rd position out of 182 countries with its HDI of 0.944.  As a comparison, the US is 
ranked in 13th place with its HDI of 0.956. The Human Development Report also tracks 
other data to monitor progress over time within as well as across countries. One of the 
data is the Gini index.27 Singapore’s Gini index has crept up as the second highest 
amongst developed countries, after Hong Kong and before the US. Among the top 30 
HDI-ranked countries, three countries, Hong Kong, Singapore and the US, are the only 
ones scoring more than 40 for its Gini index. Hong Kong, the highest is 43.4, followed by 
Singapore at 42.5 and the US at 40.8. As a comparison, Denmark, the lowest among the 
30, has a Gini index of 24.7. 
 While Singapore looks up to the United States as a leading example of an 
information society and a knowledge-based economy, it has actually beaten its role model 
at the inequality stakes. If the UN Gini index ranking is compared with HDI values, a 
sense of the inequality problem across the vast divides of the global economy becomes 
even more revealing. The US’s Gini index of 40.8 is the same as Ghana positioned 135th 
in its HDI ranking of 0.533. Singapore’s Gini index at 42.5 is the same as Kenya whose 
148th HDI position is 0.532.  What this means is that high-income countries, like United 
States and Singapore, can have high-income disparities with the scale of inequality higher 
than medium or low-income countries. Singapore can thus be described as having first 
world income but third world distribution.  
 
2.4 Meritocracy, equality and technology 
                                                                                                                                            
living a long and healthy life (measured by life expectancy), being educated (measured by adult 
literacy and enrolment at primary, secondary and tertiary level) and having a decent standard of 
living (measured by Gross Domestic Product per capita at purchasing power parity in US dollars). 
The HDI was introduced since 1990.  
 
27 The Gini index is the Gini coefficient expressed as a percentage; as with the Gini coefficient, 
the higher the Gini index, the more unequal the distribution. 
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 Singapore’s model of economic development can be described as techno-
capitalist, a term developed by Douglas Kellner to designate the knowledge-based post-
industrial capitalist economy. Techno-capitalism signifies the latter-day development of 
capitalist society in which advanced technology and scientific knowledge replace the 
former crucial factors of labour and machines in the processes of production, producing 
“new modes of societal organization, and new forms of culture and everyday life” 
(Kellner 178). The paradox of techno-capitalism lies in its form of “both progress and of 
domination” (Kellner 182). Progress, as Kellner explains, because it produces new 
technologies and modes of information that have a potentially beneficial impact on 
human life, but also domination because “it forfeits many of these potentialities by 
employing new technologies primarily as a continued imposition of commodification and 
wage labour which exacerbates class inequalities while intensifying misery and suffering 
for millions of people throughout the world” (182). Techno-capitalism aptly describes 
Singapore’s development model. Behind the impressive growth rates and growing per 
capita income, cyborgisation in techno-capitalist Singapore is aggravating growing socio-
economic disparities. The economic growth model premised on inequality is further 
exacerbated by another sacred cow behind the Singapore government’s policy-making: 
this is the state’s founding principle of meritocracy. 
 The principle behind meritocracy based on ability is well accepted. Merit-based 
selection must be blind to gender, sexuality, age, or class differences, but ignoring these 
differences, Kenneth Paul Tan maintains, may serve to deny their real influence on the 
prospects of candidates. In his study of meritocracy in Singapore, Tan argues that 
meritocracy, in practice, is often transformed into an ideology of inequality and elitism 
(8). He elaborates:  
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Meritocracy, in trying to ‘isolate’ merit by treating people with 
fundamentally unequal backgrounds, as superficially the same, can be a 
practice that ignores and even conceals the real advantages and 
disadvantages that are unevenly distributed to different segments of an 
inherently unequal society, a practice that in fact perpetuates this 
fundamental inequality. (8) 
Hence, if relevant social differences are hidden beneath “an uncritical, even celebratory, 
rhetoric of meritocracy” and “a blindness to difference”, then meritocracy itself becomes 
an ideology of inequality (Tan 8). The United States is cited as another example of a 
meritocratic society but with egalitarianism on the decline (Kenneth Arrow as quoted in 
Tan 9). Both Singapore and the US, as we have seen, are showing worsening Gini indices. 
Meritocracy, “ostensibly anti-elitist”, also becomes an ideology of inequality through co-
option by the winners, who become an elitist, “self-conscious, exploitative ruling 
minority” bent on perpetuating their power and prestige (Robert Klitgaard as quoted in 
Tan 10). Success can also depend on other factors, such as “inheritance, marriage ties, 
social connections, cultural capital, opportunities arising from developments in the 
economy and plain luck” (McNamee and Miller qted in Tan 10). When meritocracy is 
practised to an extreme in a maturing society like Singapore, Tan contends, these factors 
become obscured.  The practice of meritocracy entrenched as a state ideology in 
Singapore makes it difficult to bring up issues of disparities along class, and especially 
race and gender. In the case of gender, we have seen how female leaders themselves deny 
the need to be gender sensitive in the political power hierarchy. To cry ‘gender’ would 
seem like admitting to an inability to perform based on pure merit. The state practice of 
meritocracy in a knowledge-based economy predicated on inequality will witness greater 
67 
 
not lesser socio-economic disparities along the class, race, and gender hierarchies that 
have long been in existence, and which do not seem to be abating. 
 Tan’s critique of meritocracy producing the opposite of its intended outcome 
follows similarly the logic in Youngs’ argument that liberalism and its economically 
driven form, neoliberalism, have reached a watershed with regards to its utopian vision of 
equality and equal rights. Youngs points to an extreme mismatch between theory and 
practice, whereby the burden of practice, that is increased inequality despite greater 
overall economic development, is threatening to jeopardise the theoretical pretensions to 
the goal of equality. Similarly, the same caution is raised regarding the utopian aspirations 
of iN2015 of infocomm as a leveller of inequalities.  
 In Aihwa Ong’s analysis of Singapore’s ambitions to be Asia’s bio-tech tiger 
through building an ecology of expertise, she discusses how citizenship and its worth are 
becoming operable around specific knowledges, techniques and expertise (339). She 
quotes Nikolas Rose’s example of the government’s reconceptualization of citizenship as 
a mode of self-enterprise in neoliberal Thatcherite Britain, and under Tony Blair, the 
promotion of “technological citizenship that encourages citizens to be technologically 
informed as a way of engaging in public life” (339). A similar process appears to be 
happening in Singapore, Ong observes, with a recoding of citizenship ideals that entails 
transforming all Singaporeans into technologically informed individuals (344). Hence, 
citizens are repeatedly reminded of the need for computer training, constant retraining, 
and reskilling in order to survive in the new economy. In a cyborg state like Singapore, 
Ong raises pertinent questions on the meaning of citizenship “when those with 
technopreneurial skills can jump to the front of the line” (350), or when the new ethics 
base moral worthiness on foreign expertise (339). Billions of dollars of state money are 
bankrolling new R&D ventures with foreign research institutions and global companies; 
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money spent, it has to be said, which goes unquestioned in Singapore’s political culture. 
This contrasts greatly with the smaller funds committed to welfare assistance for the 
thousands thrown out of work during the 2009 economic downturn. 
 What does Singapore’s worsening income divide have to do with the IDA videos 
that this chapter began with? It is to be reminded of Haraway’s informatics of domination 
prevailing along the class, race, and gender tropes that are being replicated in the iN2015 
techno future imagined in the IDA videos. In concluding, iN2015 promotes a cyborg that 
is ontologically and politically one-dimensional, with its empowerment purely driven by 
consumption, making it primarily a media savvy user and consumer of new technologies. 
iN2015 enriches and enhance lives by attending mainly to the comfort needs of the 
cyborg, delivered by a seamless, flawless high tech environment. Ignoring the 
fundamental nature of ICTs in exacerbating the socio-economic and gender inequalities 
shows a total denial of the contradictions between the message of empowerment and its 
outcomes of inequalities. The failure to comprehend or to accept these contradictions 
comes from a technocratic frame of mind that sees these issues as technical problems 
requiring a technological solution and not political ones relating to social injustice. We 











  Chapter Three 
  Living in technicity 
  
 Cyborgisation under iN2015, as we saw from the last chapter, embodies different 
degrees of empowerment engendering different levels of privilege and exclusion based on 
the hierarchies of class, race, and gender. These differentiated processes of empowerment 
and disempowerment have become hidden because cyborgian technologies themselves 
are reified in a techno-capitalist economy, and their presence considered a natural state of 
affairs. They have also become hidden because cyborgian technologies require constant 
changes and adapting to these changes is now accepted as a norm of modern life. While 
the preceding chapter looked at the future imagined in iN2015 through its various 
marketing materials (the IDA videos and website), this chapter examines mainly the 
Infocomm Technology Roadmap or the ITR5 report that is driving the iN2015 vision. It 
will demonstrate that ITR5 is driven primarily by what is technologically possible and 
desirable, an outcome of a technocratic frame of mind that seems all problems as mainly 
technical ones to be fixed with technology, and how such a technocratic frame of mind 
necessitates the embrace of speed and constant innovation. Virilio’s dromology is 
relevant for his study of “the importance of speed in history and, thus, of acceleration” 
(Virilio and Armitage, “From Modernism to Hypermodernism” 16), summarised in the 
statement: “history progresses at the speed of its weapon systems” (Virilio 68). For 
Virilio, speed is the crux of change in our modern societies. Speed, he defines, is an 
acceleration of a movement. As a phenomenon, speed itself is neutral; for example, it 
creates tempo and rhythms in music. But there are different kinds of speed, and Virilio 
uses his fist as an example: it can be a gentle caress, or it can deliver a bloody nose. The 
latter, the speed of “the bloody nose”, is the kind of speed at work in society that he is 
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concerned about, which comes from the technology of war and its weaponry (Virilio and 
Lotringer 45). Living in speed-space, where real time has superceded real space, Virilio 
states: “we have become deterritorialised” (Virilio and Armitage,“From Modernism to 
Hypermodernism” 17). He gives examples of deterritorialisation in the way we live our 
lives today, “through mobile phones, through ‘live’ programming on TV, through 
telecommunications media, through Virtual Reality, through cyberspace, through video-
conferencing, through supersonic air travel” (ibid 17). The state cyborg of iN2015 
becomes addicted to acceleration inherent in new technology, living a life in technicity, 
which is a hypermodern techno life suffused by a politics of ‘disappearance’ that ignore 
the growing inequalities inherent in the cyborgisation process. This chapter examines this 
life living in technicity driven by the ITR5 report. 
 
3.1  Jumping on the broadband wagon 
 The broadband phenomenon best exemplifies Virilio’s speed-space. Broadband 
refers to a medium that allows data transmission on several channels all at the same time 
and over long distances such as cable television. Different members in a household can be 
on the telephone, download a huge music file, check email, play an online game, video 
stream a movie, and surf a website, doing these activities all at the same time. Bandwidth 
is the rate for data transfer measured as bit per second. When Internet first started, it was 
kilobits per second, 56 to be exact, on dial-up connection using an analogue modem. 
Today, it is Megabit speed (Mbps) ready to jump to Gigabit per second (Gbps) with 
Singapore’s Next Generation National Broadband Network (Next Gen NBN) built on a 
nation-wide fibre optic infrastructure. Optical fibres carry light along its length. Instead of 
transmitting data by electronics or microwaves, the signal is now transmitted by the use of 
light through glass fibre. Wrapped in bundles, optical fibres can carry images at much 
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higher bandwidths and over much longer distances compared to the previous mediums of 
copper wires and coaxial cables. When Singapore’s Next Gen NBN comes online by 
2015, it will be difficult to resist signing up for more bandwidth if one is already hooked 
up. Most in Singapore are already connected with 76% of households having Internet 
access that is on broadband speed.  
 The iN2015 vision is to make broadband ‘always-on, anywhere, anytime’, while 
research is rapidly taking place to integrate the different telecommunication devices, such 
as the landline, the cell phone, and computer Internet through Software Defined Radio, 
allowing any of the devices to pick up wireless connection for communication. ITR5 
predicts that Internet Protocol, the method or protocol by which data is sent from one 
computer to another on the Internet, will ‘rule’ the world and become the unifying 
platform for all the different telecommunication devices. When these two areas are 
resolved, the cost of bandwidth is expected to drop to a fraction of current costs, and 
unlimited bandwidth subscription is in the offing. 3G mobile broadband is on the next 
cusp to move to 4G technology that will allow data transmission at over 100 Mbps on the 
move and 1 Gbps stationary. ITR5 also predicts broadband from the home and office 
moving very quickly to broadband on the individual. By 2015, the ubiquity of very-short-
range wireless systems will allow for personal area networks, wireless sensor networks, 
and even the body to become an area network, while Ultra-Wideband will enable high 
speed data transfer of 1 Gbps and beyond in close proximity to the user. With 
communications and computing converging with nano-technologies, ITR5 foresees a 
person carrying terabytes of storage around, declaring: “Just as the PC and Internet 
transformed our lives, when this threshold is crossed, our lives will never be the same 
again (Executive Summary 5). At our fingertips, will be “a walking office, databank, 
software and entertainment centre available wherever we are and at anytime we want 
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them” (ibid 2). ITR5 expects vehicles to have Internet access and become a mobile office 
and entertainment centre. When sentient technologies become commonly prevalent, ITR5 
envisions closing the last inch for the Internet to connect to the real world in smart spaces. 
The IDA videos showed these future scenarios where wearable computing devices, 
sensors, and body area networks create smart individual spaces with seamless 
connectivity. ITR5 also speculates the Internet extending into the skin or body, if this is 
necessary, for the right individual in the right context. All these embedded computing 
interfaces and technologies “aim to help humans interface better with the digital world” 
(ITR5 Sentient Technologies 31). 
 The developments described above demonstrate what it means living permanently 
in Virilio’s speed-space, where speed is no longer a means but a milieu characterised by 
instantaneity, simultaneity, and ubiquity. When the Semantic Web arrives, any object, 
including our bodies that can have a microprocessor embedded, can be wirelessly 
connected. The example given by ITR5 is the Internet connected microwave oven 
checking the maker’s website for optimal cooking parameters. For such a future ahead of 
us, incredibly high broadband speed will be needed. Broadband subscription has become, 
tantalisingly, the “new conscription” (Bartram 290). Bandwidth intensive services and 
applications are, already, coming on stream such as Internet Protocol High Definition TV 
with its growing programme choices, creating the continual demand for more bandwidth. 
To be the state cyborg in iN2015, one would have to be armed with broadband speeds that 
are as fast as possible.  
 Broadband penetration is now treated as a key economic indicator of a country’s 
development as ITR5 concludes: “Generally, countries with high broadband penetration 
levels also have high levels of gross national income” (Communications in the Future 2). 
Finland recently became the first country in the world to declare broadband Internet 
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access a legal right.28 While the United Nations is pushing to make Internet access a 
human right with its legal adoption by countries, Finland has taken a step further by 
legally mandating speed of at least 1 Mbps. Defining broadband by bandwidth keeps 
shifting because of changing technology. Broadband started with 256kbps, while the 
International Telecommunication Union, UN’s specialized agency for 
telecommunications, has defined broadband as having access speed of 1.5Mbps. At time 
of writing, the fastest nation, Japan, has speeds of over 90Mbps, followed by France and 
South Korea at over 40Mbps, and Sweden over 20Mbps. Comparing with the slowest end 
of the broadband spectrum, South Africa and China have access speeds of 1Mbps.29 
Having broadband adds a further layer to the existing global digital disparity because of 
access and affordability. Access to broadband services in low-income developing 
countries is restricted and very expensive. Only 5.5 % of the world population has fixed 
broadband access, with 74% of these subscribers from high-income countries. Mobile 
broadband is expected to take over fixed line broadband, especially in developing 
countries that lack reliable telephone line infrastructure. But the take-up rate is still much 
higher in wealthier countries, with 14% in the developed world against 0.9% in the 
developing world.30 With average broadband speed around 8-10 Mbps and climbing 
upwards continually, Singapore belongs to the club of the broadband rich. 
 Singapore has received many accolades and awards in various ICT rankings, such 
as e-readiness, IT industry competitiveness, or ICT coverage, and these are proudly 
                                                
28 “Fast Internet Access Becomes a Legal Right in Finland.” CNN 15 Oct 2009. 
29 “Broadband speeds around the world.” BBC News. 2 Dec 2007.  
 
30 UN’s International Telecommunication Union collects the most comprehensive range of 
statistics on ICT penetration, accessibility and use. All these figures reported are obtained from 





displayed on IDA’s website.31 If the digital divide is measured in terms of accessibility 
and affordability, Singapore ranks 7th in the world.32 The iN2015 strategy to build 
Singapore’s Next Gen NBN, the nation-wide fibre optic broadband infrastructure, which 
IDA boasts as the world’s first, will deliver ultra-high speed bandwidth to every home 
and building. Singapore’s geography and size, of course, makes for easy diffusion of 
ICTs. Two iN2015 goals aim to have every home with school-going children owning a 
computer and at least 90% of all homes using broadband. These goals are well on their 
way to being achieved. In 2006, 78% of households with at least one computer have 
increased to 80% in 2008, and 71% with home Internet access have grown to 76% during 
these two years. When it comes to telecommunication usage, the growth has even been 
more phenomenal. Mobile phone penetration rate exceeded 131% in 2008 from 103.4% 
in 2006. Home broadband exceeded 99.9% in 2008 compared to 62.8% in 2006, while the 
number of broadband subscribers has shot up to 4,715,900 from 768,300 in these two 
years.33 The iN2015 mission is to develop a digitally inclusive society: “one which ensure 
infocomm access and competencies for all” (iN2015 101). The government has certainly 
gone out of its way in these effort, targeting those on the other side of the digital divide: 
that is, the needy, the elderly, and the disabled. The NEU PC Plus Programme by early 
2009 helped more than 2,700 needy households with school-going children with 
computer and three-year broadband subcription costing as little as $300 per household. 
Learning hubs for senior citizens called Silver Infocomm Junctions (SIJs) have opened to 
equip senior citizens with digital lifestyle skills and knowledge. The government has also 
                                                
31 This IDA webpage contains a list Singapore’s accolades and awards for its IT rankings as well 
as the latest infocomm statistics.  
 
32 This ranking is based on 2007 data provided online by the International Telecommunication 
Union.  
 




planned computer clusters at 100 convenient locations over the next three years, which 
older people can use for free. For the disabled, the Infocomm Accessibility Centre (IAC) 
was set up in July 2008 to offer structured certification path for industry-relevant training, 
IT-related apprenticeship, as well as library facilities for assistive technology equipment. 
By default, everyone will not escape cyborgisation having to live in a cyborg society.  
 While these programmes are commendable in facilitating media access to many 
who would otherwise be cut off from cyberspace, the anxiety of speed and constant 
changes are inadvertently forced on everyone. The technological imperative driving the 
propulsion towards more speed in ITR5 has been based on macro technology trends, 
being watched and followed in the industry. These trends have been described as ‘laws’ 
and Moore’s Law rules here.  
 According to Moore’s Law, the number of transistors that can be placed 
inexpensively on an integrated circuit increases at a fixed rate. Intel co-founder Gordon E. 
Moore in 1965 predicted the rate to be exponential, doubling approximately every two 
years. Moore’s Law is therefore not a naturally occurring law but a prediction based on an 
observation. The more it became widely accepted, the more it turned into a goal for an 
entire industry. Moore’s law, thus, became a benchmark for competing electronics 
industries as well as scientists and engineers in the field of semiconductors to work 
towards achieving the specified increase in processing power. Moore himself admitted the 
‘law’ has become a self-fulfilling prophecy as companies rushed to keep ahead.34 Since 
1965, the trend has persisted, and is expected to continue till 2015. 
 ITR5 also accepts another five ‘laws’ of technology and quotes these in their 
report. Disk law states storage doubles every 12 months; Fibre law predicts 
communications doubling every nine months; Metcalfe’s law forecasts that the value of a 
                                                




network increases by the square of the number of devices connected to it; and lastly, 
Community Law states that content increases 2x, with x being the number of people. Like 
Moore’s Law, these are not laws of physics, ironclad and empirically founded, but 
predictions, even speculations, which are being treated almost as factual.   
 Complying with these macro trends would mean forcing perpetual technological 
change in our environment. Bernard Stiegler, who uses the term ‘technics’ from the Greek 
word tekhne, talks about the specificity of modern technology, which resides essentially 
in its speed of evolution (27). This leads to conflating the question of technology with the 
question of time, whereby Stiegler concludes, “technics far from being merely in time, 
properly constitutes time” (27). Technology has, thus, now entered a state of permanent 
innovation and the driver is speed itself. The pursuit of speed and constant innovation are 
valorized as unquestioned and unquestionable (Bartram 289). The more we value speed in 
the drive for technological progress, the more we fall into the trap of technological 
determinism, where technological change is accepted as an independent factor impacting 
society from outside of society. This implies, as mentioned earlier, a passive rather an 
active attitude to technological change: one that adapts to rather than shaping 
technological change. The technology of speed warrants an examination of a political 
economy of speed, which we will now discuss. 
 
3.2  Chronopolitics or the political economy of speed 
 Virilio agitates for an urgent analysis of a political economy of speed because 
speed has become a new source of capital and power. One way of understanding this is to 
look at how money is made today. Activist-scholar Walden Bello shows how speculative 
activity as a mode of profit making now outperforms trade. Using 2007 data, Bello 
compares the daily value of foreign exchange transactions in the international market 
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totalling US$1.9 trillion to the annual value of world trade in goods and services of 
US$9.1 trillion (para 6). In other words, speculative activity in the global financial 
markets in a single day amounts to 20 per cent of the annual value of world trade. 
Translated to a yearly total, speculative foreign exchange transactions amount to over 
US$694 trillion that is 76 times more compared to the trade in goods and services of 
US$9.1 trillion. Today more money is made out of money than from making things or 
growing food. The 1997 Asian financial crisis is a prime example of how foreign 
exchange speculation brought ruin overnight to many East Asian and South-east Asian 
economies. Since then, the feverish activity in the global financial markets has not 
abetted. Eleven years later, in September 2008, a global economic recession was 
unleashed by the collapse of many old and established banks and financial institutions; 
first in the United States and then Britain, the severity of which has been compared to the 
Great Depression of the 1930’s. Taxpayers’ money in the billions have been spent to bail 
out banks and financial institutions, while thousands of individuals have suffered personal 
financial calamities, and more lost jobs. This is not to attribute the cause of the crisis to 
technology itself but to show how ICTs have speeded up the global flow of speculative 
capital. Given the historical pattern of 100 financial crises in the last thirty years and a 
global financial system that is structurally difficult to revamp, Bello predicts more crises 
in the future (para 3). With instant and simultaneous transactions happening 24-hours 
non-stop in the global networked market, crises have become difficult to contain, which 
harks back to Virilio’s warning of an integral and globally constituted accident. 
 When Virilio speaks of speed as a source of capital and power, he is referring to 
how speed or the symbolic possession of speed becomes a source of power.  Certain 
groups or people have this power and have become icons of power themselves. John 
Armitage and Joanne Roberts describe them as the global kinetic elites who inhabit 
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chronotopia, a term formed from the Greek concepts for speed and utopia. They define 
these elites as “hypermodernity’s leading techno-social, political and entrepreneurial 
groups and organisations,” such as the elites of the computer industry and online e-
communities, famous computer scientists, and technical magazine writers (46). 
Chronotopia refers to the ‘social imaginary’ of the global kinetic elites whose ideas are 
popularly circulating in popular contemporary business literature broadly centred on 
cyberspace, such as Bill Gates’ The Road Ahead and Business@The Speed of Thought. 
The titles are themselves evocative of valorising the speed of change in the connected 
economy. While Armitage and Roberts do acknowledge the work of some of these global 
kinetic elites in trying to address inequalities, such as the digital divide, they argue that 
these efforts turn out to be futile. Quoting Manuell Castells, when the digitally 
dispossessed overcome one form of inequality such as social access to the Internet, 
another opens up such as access to high-speed broadband service (47). With technology 
permanently innovating, Armitage and Roberts argue the digital gap never closes, making 
it difficult if not impossible for the digitally (s)lower classes to catch up. Negroponte’s 
US$100 computer for the poor children of Africa would be viewed in the same light of 
how technology offered as solutions by the global kinetic elites could end up benefiting 
the giver more than the receiver.  
 Kroker and Weinstein, more suspicious of the global kinetic elites, call them the 
virtual class who can ride effortlessly on the digital superhighway. The virtual class, they 
declare, are gung-ho about technology because they are in a position most able to exploit 
its capitalist opportunities (2). The digital superhighway, “a site of global power”, 
becomes their ruling metaphor as well as playground because cyberspace has opened up 
new wealth generating possibilities for them (Kroker and Weinstein 25). Meanwhile, the 
information superhighway, “remains an invisible, placeless, floating electronic space to 
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the unvirtualised classes” who are the digitally (s)lower classes (ibid 25). In other words, 
closing the digital divide ends up benefiting the virtual class because getting everybody 
on the Internet actually profits those who are already ahead in the technology game.  
 The ambitions of iN2015 for a digitally inclusive society would, thus, serve to 
benefit the global kinetic elites or the virtual class in Singapore more than the digitally 
(s)lower classes themselves. The infocomm workforce in Singapore is one that is highly 
educated and young. The 2005 statistics on infocomm workforce shows 80% as tertiary 
educated with more than 70% below 40 years of age. Retraining the older and digitally 
un-initiated seems like a losing battle in an economy that is constantly restructuring to 
embrace the rapidly changing technological world. When technology is permanently 
innovating, constant de-skilling takes place in the economy, where skills become 
redundant faster and faster, especially for the labouring classes and those without access 
to modern technology.  Hence, the Singapore economy will have a perennial problem 
with the digitally (s)lower classes. While unemployment during the current recession has 
stabilised since the second quarter of 2008, the number of long-term unemployed persons 
crept to 25,800 in June, up from 9,500 in the same month last year and 16,600 in March 
this year.  Out of the total number of chronically unemployment, 60% comprised the 
older and less educated job seekers.35  Unemployment will discipline them to accept 
lower paying jobs in the informal sector; their situation of exploitation being easily 
obscured in the knowledge-based economy. The problems of the digitally (s)lower classes 
are often presented as problems of individual maladjustment in a knowledge-based 
economy dictated by the changing global environment rather than a societal problem 
created by a deliberate economic ideology. Today’s technology of speed has, thus, 
produced a politics of disappearance that totally ignore the growing inequalities inherent 
                                                
35 Lin, Tanqin. “Worry over more staying jobless longer.” Today 16 September 2009.  
80 
 
in the cyborgisation process. We need to understand this politics of disappearance in a 
cyborg state. 
 
3.3  The cyborgian politics of disappearance  
 Virilio’s catastrophic theory is based on war being “the laboratory of speed” and 
war becoming “the laboratory of the future” (Virilio and Dercon 72). The cyborg’s 
collusions with the military trouble Virilio and Haraway but find ready acceptance by 
technologists,because many consumer and popular culture technology have their origins 
in military research that is US-led. The US Department of Defense has a central research 
and development organisation called Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
(DARPA). Its main objective is to pursue research and technology “where risk and payoff 
are both very high and where success may provide dramatic advances for traditional 
military roles and missions and dual-use applications.” One example of a dual-use 
application and the most famous to emerge from DARPA is the ARPA-NET, the 
precursor of the Internet. When something as revolutionary as the Internet has resulted 
from military research, it is easy to dismiss Virilio’s catastrophic nature of technology as 
techno-phobic. DARPA has a semi-divine reputation among scientists and technologists 
the world over, co-funding many current university and commercial R&D projects around 
the world. In the same light, ITR5 looks up to DARPA as a leader in advanced concepts. 
Iris technology, for example, is an application that was derived from military use on 
flying UAVs (unmanned aerial vehicles) tracking ground-moving targets. It is now 
commonly used for biometric identification and recognition at a distance, and works even 
when the person is moving. ITR5 expects that “military inventions will contribute 
strongly to future inventions” (Sentient Technologies 22). ITR5 cites examples of 
innovative R&D in defence that are relevant for the commercial world such as: 
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[…] smart materials in zero-power displays for air pilot headgears, virtual 
reality and simulators, MEMS (micro-electronic mechanical systems), 
smart dust, self-organising wireless sensor networks and mass intelligence, 
chemical and biological sensors, self-regenerative portable power for 
soldiers. (ibid 33) 
For the next disruptive technology, ITR5 encourages thinking along the lines of the US 
Department of Defense’s current questioning: “how do we change the way we think about 
regular operations to take full advantage of the new networked sensor technology,” 
instead of the conventional “how do I use sensor networks to better do what I do today?” 
(ibid 33). Both countries, the United States and Singapore, enjoy close military relations; 
Singapore having now four defence training detachments based in the United States 
testing and training on military aircraft purchased from the American government such as 
the F-15, the Chinook helicopter, the Apache attack helicopter, and the F-16. Singapore 
will continue to look towards the United States for its lead in military research to find the 
next disruptive technology.  
 The pace in the search for the next disruptive technology has become so relentless 
that technology transfers between the military and the civilian worlds are now taking 
place in both directions, instead of the military leading the way. It has become difficult to 
distinguish where one ends and the other begins, and the connections are even closing in 
terms of time lag. James Der Derian, following Virilio’s path tracing new technologies 
back to their (military) origins, maps the military-industrial-media-entertainment network 
in his book, Virtuous War. He makes several observations on technology transfers 
between the military and the entertainment world (90). One example is a war simulation 
exercise, where the Marine Corps used the video game Doom and customised it for a 
command and control exercise in a situation of chaos. This appropriation is significant, 
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Der Derian highlights, because it shows a technology transfer in the opposite direction of 
military applications customarily leading the way in R&D. The relationship between 
military simulations, the development of the computer, and the entertainment industry has 
been very close from the start, but the relationship is no longer led by the military. 
Another example Der Derian cites is the US navy’s purchase of its first aircraft simulator 
from its designer Edward Link in 1931. A year later, while the military still had that only 
one, an amusement park had bought close to 50.  He concludes the development lag 
between the real thing and its simulation has just about disappeared: weapon systems such 
as the F-16, the MIA2 tank, and the Aegis cruiser to the latest nuclear aircraft carrier have 
the video-game version arriving on the shelves almost immediately after they first appear 
(90). Such developments have also influenced John Armitage and Phil Graham to argue: 
“warfare has become industrialised while trade has itself become outright war”; both are 
driven by a “hypermodern managerialist emphasis” on the need for speed (2).   
 One major driving force for developing new technologies is in the area of security. 
Homeland and defence security has been identified as a long-term challenge with the rise 
of terrorism threats both in the real world and in cyberspace. Defending one’s land has 
been a rallying point for nation building, especially in a new country like Singapore. 
Enemies, real or imagined, are often a useful strategy used historically by states to unite a 
people to defend what is at stake or to divert them from focusing on domestic problems. 
This brings to bear Der Derian’s question while he was examining the United States’ 
military budget as the world’s largest spender. In the 2000 list of the top ten spenders, the 
US spends more than the total amount of the next nine countries’ defence budgets, 
prompting Der Derian to ask: “Just where is this enemy who justifies such expenditure?” 
(111). Der Derian adds that America has been deprived of enemies of equal capabilities 
and will, and ponders if this defence spending comes at a disproportionately high and 
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perhaps dangerously high cost. After 9/11, the US military budget doubled. Der Derian 
asks rhetorically if this huge expenditure on the new weapon systems, such as next 
generation avionics (aviation and electronics), has kept America safe, make the world 
more peaceful, or brought more justice to international relations (111). From the 
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the latest 2008 figures show 
the US’ military budget has increased to become equivalent to the total budget of the next 
top twenty-nine spenders.36 Singapore, for its tiny size, is surprisingly the world’s 25th top 
spender. For a comparison of the scale of military budgets among the top thirty spenders 
in the 2008 list: United States with the highest budget spent over US$548 billion, 
People’s Republic of China, the next highest, was over US$63 billion, while Singapore in 
the 25th top position spent US$5.8 billion.37  
 Given that war overshadows society, Der Derian strongly believes the study of the 
mimetic relationship to violence in society has been grossly neglected. It does not take 
much imagination to link the violence in video games to its war origins. Which world 
mimics which now? Academic social studies have not arrived at a causal relationship 
between the effects of watching violence on screen and violent behaviour in its viewers. 
Not being able to prove the causality here does not mean there is no effect or relationship. 
While war is the biggest example of a human calamity of great violence, other forms of 
violence should be studied. Here we are reminded of Virilio’s statement of the accident 
becoming ordinary. Der Derian gives examples of everyday violence, such as “state 
violence of political realism, class violence of social realism and now techno violence of 
hyperrealism” (33). Violence here is not physical injuries sustained or lives lost in war, 
                                                
36 The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) covers 172 countries and has 
been collecting data since 1988 from open sources and questionnaire sent to all countries.  
 
37 For the comparison, the SIPRI figures are values of the national budgets at constant (2005) 
prices. The actual budgets in the local currencies are actually higher. 
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but violence committed on an everyday level of reality, unostentatious and almost 
imperceptible. Accidents, in this Virilian sense, could be the socio-psychological 
problems experienced in society, as it becomes more hooked up to Internet culture. It 
would, thus, be critical in a wide-reaching policy document such as the ITR5 report to see 
if ‘accidents’ are anticipated. Throughout the report, the tone about future technology is 
unremittingly optimistic. Some issues have been brought up but not to the extent of any 
grave concern. We need to comprehend if and how ITR5 views the potential accident in 
technology.  
 
3.4 ITR5 and the potential accident in technology  
 The ITR5 report is divided into three sections called tracks. Track 1 covers 
Sentient Technologies, track 2 looks at Communications in the Future, and track 3 
focuses on Computing Revolutions with Nano and Bio. Under track 3, no problems or 
issues were broached in the report. Track 2 looking at communication technologies raises 
the most issues among the three waves of technological change. Here, ITR5 highlights the 
potential health risk associated with long-term exposure to radiation from mobile phones. 
Studies, so far, have not been conclusive, it reports, because the problems have not been 
studied long enough. However, ITR5 points to a Swedish study suggesting that people 
who use the mobile phone for at least ten years might increase their risk of developing a 
rare benign tumour along a nerve on the side of the head where they hold the phone. ITR5 
expresses surprise at this result and concludes that more long-term research is warranted, 
but makes no commitments regarding Singapore’s research interest in health issues 
related to the increasing use of technology in our environment. On the impact of 
communication technologies on society and individuals, one concern was the protection 
of minors against growing adult content on the Internet as well as chat room predators. 
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ITR5 sees effective supervision here to be impossible with wireless Internet and mobile 
broadband, but takes consolation in the fact that these location-based services would at 
least provide parents with the ability to locate the children’s whereabouts. ITR5 views 
self-regulation by mobile operators as a more effective measure and cites Vodaphone’s 
filtering and blocking measures as an example. Another problem ITR5 brings up is spam 
that has grown from a minor annoyance to a significant global economic and social 
problem. According to ITR5, industry estimates spam formed over 60% of global email 
traffic today, becoming a drain on the global economy, and costing more than US$20 
billion in wasted technical resources. ITR5 reports that IDA has taken a multi-pronged 
approach to combat spam, using a combination of public education, industry self-
regulation and anti-spam legislation. Finally, ITR5 highlights the commercial exploitation 
of personal data and information via electronic communications on the Internet, and 
detailed tracking of an individual’s day-to-day activities through ‘location’ and ‘usage’ 
information easily collected by the service provider. But it does not see governments 
explicitly banning such activities because it says “they want to have the power to access 
such information for purposes of crime prevention, anti-terrorism and other security 
related concerns” (ITR5 “Communications in the Future” 11).  
 Under track 1 on sentient technologies, the issue of personal privacy was 
mentioned along with the subject of Smart Dust, the billions of invisible sensors 
dissipated into our environment, with implications for security, human health and 
individual privacy. ITR5 makes two responses. The first is Singapore’s unequivocal 
position to march on with the new technology because Singapore cannot afford to be left 
behind, while others speed ahead to take advantage of the new opportunities. The second 
response, more revealing about the trust in technology, is the attitude of ready 
opportunism, seizing opportunities to develop more technology. ITR5 cites research work 
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in Privacy Enhancing Technologies to counter information tapping and privacy intrusion. 
In a way, such responses could be described as being positive and making the most of an 
Orwellian scenario that Singapore has no control over. But I would argue that the 
response is more a reflection of a technocratic frame of mind that sees technology 
automatically as a solution to problems of technology. It is not surprising to find, as 
James Beniger stresses, “thus technology appears autonomously to beget technology” 
(qted in Hershock 591).  Peter Hershock quotes Ivan Illich in his studies of transportation, 
educational, and medical technologies, where “beyond locally specifiable levels of 
development”, technologies become “self-promoting, generating precisely the kind of 
problems they are suited to solving” (ibid 594). Hershock concurs describing how 
technologies have thresholds of utility beyond which they begin producing conditions of 
their own necessity (594). In believing that we are in control because we always have 
recourse to technology to solve problems, is to find ourselves in increasingly controlled 
circumstances (Hershock 595).  
 This total and unquestionable trust in technology is demonstrated when ITR5 
discusses how sentient technologies can contribute to “strategic national government 
concerns” (“Sentient Technologies” 11). It quotes a previous IDA study on People 
Technologies defined as technologies that empower humans to exploit digital knowledge. 
A summary is offered here. The study finds an unsustainable trend whereby knowledge 
accumulation is exponentially increasing with the Internet but ahead of population 
demographic growth, thus “revealing a shortage of talents to absorb and integrate 
mankind’s pool of knowledge” (ibid 11). Labour, on the other hand, has become highly 
specialised leading to further sub-specialisations of labour. ITR5 cites the example of a 
medical case that may require a physician, a radiologist, then a paediatric radiologist, and 
then a paediatric neuro-radiologist to show how these specialisations place stringent 
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demands on specific individuals to absorb and share an exclusive domain of knowledge. 
ITR5 quotes the case of operating on the Siamese twins that required a team of 20 
specialists and 50 nurses, thereby implying that too many specialists were involved. ITR5 
believes that while machine automation cannot replace the role of medical specialists or 
nurses, machines can close “the gap between global knowledge generation and a nation’s 
ability to make use of it” (ibid 11).  The conclusion quoted verbatim: 
Machine assisted environments, or smart spaces, advanced human-
computer interfaces, faster and more accurate computer processing and 
mining of knowledge, automated sensor networks, learning machine 
agents and programmes, can all help to boost performance in a knowledge-
driven economy. (ibid 11) 
I am not totally disagreeing here but argue that looking at everything from a technocratic 
perspective can be worrying. ITR5 wants to leave more to machines to think and act for 
us because it truly believes machines are smarter and more reliable than humans. Such a 
technocratic frame of mind fails to see the catastrophic potential in technology, as warned 
by Virilio, or that growing inequalities inherent in new technologies are issues that are 
political in nature relating to social injustice, not technical problems requiring 
technological solutions. We are also reminded of Haraway’s caveat of how the new 
machines have become disturbingly alive while humans frighteningly inert. These new 
machines or cyborgian tehnologies are not mere tools and appendages, but in the world of 
cybernetics, have become now “self-moving”, “self-designing” and “autonomous” 
(Haraway 152). 
 In conclusion, there is no doubt that the cyborgian technologies in ITR5 will 
propel us nearer and nearer towards an immersive and pervasive virtual world as depicted 
in the iN2015 and Next Gen videos. Arthur Kroker describes a person living in such a 
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technological society as a possessed individual where “virtual reality–the world of digital 
dreams come alive–is what the possessed individual is possessed by” (2). Virilio, with his 
techno speed criticism, disapproves of the virtual world predicting it will become so 
powerful that it will take over actual reality. Being possessed by virtual reality is to live in 
Albert Borgmann’s hyperreal conditions of hypermodernism, where the tendency in our 
allegiance to technology is  “to give technology a hyperfine and hypercomplex design” 
(82). Hyperreality reaches a final stage, according to Borgmann, when the artificial 
becomes a new reality that surpasses traditional reality in the three qualities of brilliance, 
richness and pliability (83). Visiting the zoo can be described as a hyperreal experience of 
the wild, but projecting a video in the clean and comfortable living room, seen in the 
iN2015 video, takes it further to its final stage of hyperreality. In this hyperreal stage, 
images are enhanced to make it more brilliant, more rich than the real encounter, and the 
experience totally pliable in that it can be ended at one’s will in one’s safe and 
comfortable living room, compared to encountering nature in all its continuous and 
commanding presence (Borgmann 96). This is exactly Virilio’s concern with virtual 
reality, a precondition for living in hyperreality. The state cyborg of iN2015 inhabits this 
hypermodern techno life that can be described as living perpetually in technicity, one that 
is addicted to innovation, speed, and the hyperreal. Such a life results from a technocratic 
vision that is always seeking the perfect technical system, believing that all problems 
have a technological solution lying ahead in the future, thus overlooking current socio-
political dimensions of the cyborgisation process that are aggravating existing socio-







  Conclusion 
 
  Singapore’s cyborg destiny 
 
  
 The thesis declares at its start that Singapore makes an excellent study of the 
cyborg phenomenon, quoting Alwyn Lim that to write a history of Singapore’s 
development is also to write a history of technology in Singapore. National ICT plans 
have shaped Singapore’s technological environment in the last three decades of its 44-
year history, with the most ambitious plan to date consisting in the Intelligent Nation 
2015 master plan. The thesis is interested in the concerns and issues underpinning the 
cyborgisation of Singapore from this sweeping and wide-reaching ICT policy document 
accepted as the definitive authority of all things technological in Singapore. The 
investigation reveals that iN2015 engenders a cyborgisation process driven mainly by the 
technologically possible and desirable with consequences that are contradictory to its 
aspirations of a digital future that is empowering for all. It also discovers that the iN2015 
produces cyborgs as one-dimensional, ontologically and politically, with its message of 
empowerment driven mainly by consumption, while living a life in technicity; a 
hypermodern techno lifestyle, addicted to speed, innovation, and the hyperreal. In the 
investigation of iN2015, Haraway’s cyborg has been lobbied precisely to find other 
ontological and political possibilities of responding to and living in the ICT world. How 
has Haraway’s cyborg metaphor helped in going beyond the limitations of the iN2015 
cyborg? And how have contributions from Virilio and Youngs helped in the interrogation 
of the ontology and politics of new technology promoted under iN2015? The thesis will 
conclude reviewing these questions. It will also briefly survey the progress of iN2015 
three years after it was launched, and finally close with a note on the limitations of the 
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thesis offering possible areas for future investigation that have surfaced during the course 
of the current research.  
 
1 Haraway, Virilio and Youngs and the iN2015 landscape 
 The cyborg has been used as the main lens in the thesis through which to 
investigate the iN2015 vision and mission. The cyborg originally refers to a 
technologically enhanced human whether biochemical, mechanical or electronic, but its 
usage begins losing its innocent connotation with the advent of ICTs and all the new 
technologies that have since been spawned. Thus, the cyborg has become associated more 
specifically with new technologies centred around ICTs. The cyborgisation of modern 
society, as the thesis has stated several times, is inevitable today and its influence 
unavoidable particularly in the Singapore metropolis. While we might not be cyborgs, we 
most certainly live in a cyborg society. Without a doubt, iN2015 is speeding up the 
cyborgisation of Singapore affecting almost every aspect of the nation’s life, obliging its 
citizens to become cyborgs to live in the brave new technological world of tomorrow. 
Neither iN2015, nor its infocomm technology roadmap, ITR5, uses the cyborg term. The 
thesis finds this omission, or the lack of reference to the cyborg discourse, problematic, 
because such an omission reflects a certain frame of mind directing and shaping the future 
for Singapore. 38 This frame of mind has been described in the thesis as technocratic: one 
that holds supreme confidence in a technotopia, which is a utopia that is mainly delivered 
by things technological. The technocratic mindset believes that all problems are of a 
technical nature that can be solved with technology while often ignoring socio-political 
and even technological dimensions of current problems. Thus, adopting the term, cyborg, 
                                                
38 There was one reference made to an article that was summarily dismissed. See page 11.  
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has been necessary to suggest there are concerns and issues arising from the increasing 
cyborgisation of Singapore under iN2015, particularly as its vision promises technotopia.  
 Haraway’s cyborg metaphor has been used to show that these concerns and issues 
have ontological and socio-political dimensions. But when it comes to a policy document, 
how effective is Haraway’s cyborg in its investigation of the iN2015 master plan? 
Admittedly, it has been challenging to apply the theory drawn from an American 
perspective of a feminist scientist to a Singapore situation with its survival mentality 
entrenched in the minds of policy makers as well as in its people. Eventually, two areas 
stand out where Haraway’s cyborg has been found extremely relevant, which have been 
further reinforced by contributions from writers Virilio and Youngs for both their 
analogous views and divergent approaches. The first area deals with the question of 
techno pessimism, and the second area concerns the particular ontology and politics of 
Haraway’s cyborg. I will now discuss both. 
 A nagging concern that has dogged this analysis of Singapore’s cyborgian destiny 
through the iN2015 vision is how to prevent its reading as anti-technology. Lobbying 
Haraway’s cyborg as a platform for examining the productive tensions in the machine-
organism symbiosis was one way to dispel the anti-technology charge. The paradoxical 
relationship with new technology, represented by Haraway’s cyborg, shows just how 
unproductive and overly simplistic it is to draw the line on technology between the two 
opposing positions of total denial or blanket affirmation. The thesis, instead, endorses the 
ontological status of the cyborg, which is its machine-organism hybridity, accepting 
Haraway’s position that returning to their separate status is not possible or even desirable 
any more. To ask the question, can we do without technology, is pointless, as remarked 
by Virilio. Instead, the question of technology should be expanded not only to the 
substance produced, referring to their instrumental purposes but also to its potential 
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accident. Applying Virilio’s epistemo-technical questioning, the ‘accident’ or accidents in 
technology are what the thesis has been interested in uncovering in intelligent nation 
Singapore under iN2015. In other words, the technological is accepted as constitutive of 
the human society. What is in question is the attitude towards technology and the kind of 
technologies promoted too readily without epistemo-technical questioning.  For Haraway, 
the accident or accidents of technology are the growing disparities along the power 
hierarchies of class, race, and gender, ferociously still in place in the informatics of 
domination. For Virilio, the accident or accidents are virtual reality taking over actual 
reality with all its implications, including that of the information bomb unleashing an 
integral and globally constituted accident. Generally, Virilio is viewed as being anti-
technology, while Haraway holds a more hopeful position. Toggling between these two 
positions of Haraway’s and Virilio’s has actually helped to surface the assumptions and 
contradictions in the attitude towards technology. Virilio is highly critical of technology 
viewing its origins in military weaponry as their essential nature that can never be 
relinquished. If we look at how war has featured in the whole of human history, how the 
arms race has dominated international relations, and how important the arms industry has 
become for many national economies, Virilio’s critique must be taken on board when 
investigating new technology. Haraway also acknowledges the cyborg’s origins in 
militarism and patriarchal capitalism (she includes state socialism here), and describes 
these as the cyborg’s main trouble. But Haraway departs from Virilio in her more hopeful 
position on the potential possibilities of new technology, seeing cyborgs as signalling 
both  “disturbingly and pleasurably tight coupling” (152). Is this too much of a 
compromising position? Haraway uses her position-that of a feminist scientist-to show 
that one need not be duped while negotiating through the world of science and 
technology. If Virilio’s epistemo-technical approach is to be adopted, this requires 
93 
 
knowledge of the tools that have marked the world “that marked them as other” (ibid 
175). What is crucial in both Haraway’s and Virilio’s positions is to be reminded of the 
cyborg’s origins. As Haraway has stressed, the new machines are disturbingly alive while 
humans are frightening inert.  Hence, it becomes critical to be mindful of the ontology 
and politics of new technology and for this, Haraway’s cyborg takes centre-stage again. 
 This thesis began by discussing many cyborgs but two were specially mentioned. 
Clynes and Kline’s originally named cyborg refers to an enhanced human exogeneously 
extended to adapt and survive in extreme environments. Haraway’s cyborg is the 
ubiquitous human-machine hybrid in our posthuman times, but one committed to a 
feminist, socialist and materialist politics. What counts as extreme environment differs for 
the two cyborgs. Clynes and Kline’s extreme environment refers to a physical 
environment–outer space for man’s next conquest. Haraway’s environment is the 
posthuman condition where peoples and worlds have become reconstructed as pure 
information and data. For Haraway, this ‘extreme environment’ has been largely created 
by the cyborgian technologies producing the informatics of domination ferociously 
reinforcing the hierarchies of class, race, and gender. Haraway’s informatics of 
domination, the scary new networks, is pernicious on two counts. The first is, as 
informatics, the networks reduce organisms to pure information and data, becoming 
merely ‘a problem in coding’, thus reducing differences as genetic or information codes, 
and masking the objectification of bodies as commodities. The second is, precisely as 
informatics, the networks make it easy to be integrated into “the world system of 
production/reproduction and communication” (Haraway 163), appearing as empowerment 
when it can simultaneously be an exploitation of labour and personal data. While 
Haraway was referring to women working in the integrated circuit, this could also include 
social networking websites, such as Facebook increasing its proprietory value as more 
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users and personal data are captured. In contrast to these two worlds of Clynes and 
Kline’s and Haraway’s, we have the normative middle class environment of the iN2015 
cyborg saturated with Next Gen devices and the smart sentient technologies of the future 
as shown in the IDA videos. The iN2015 cyborg is idealised as a consummate consumer 
of new technologies, living a life totally in technicity, while the dynamics of social 
reality, such as one’s identity and social relations, remain totally unchanged. The iN2015 
landscape testifies Virilio’s caution on the aesthetics of disappearance, and how the 
technology of speed has seductively bought easy acquiescence for all its consumer 
outcomes. iN2015 is a landscape of pure technotopia, and as a utopia, it has been 
removed totally from reality. But the iN2015 technotopia is sold not to the digitally 
s(lower) classes or the hungry masses. It is sold to those who are already privileged, with 
their feet and bodies firmly in the technological world. A good reminder comes from 
Youngs’ argument of inequality as a driving force for growth and development. In an 
existing unequal world, ICTs have been sold as an economic leveller. Like any tool, they 
offer opportunities, but because it is an unequal world, ICTs can further embed the 
inequities, particularly those related to socio-economic and gender differences. In that 
regard, Haraway’s hopeful position on technology may seem overly optimistic. Thus, the 
cyborg, as a strategic intervention in an emerging world order totally mediated by new 
technology, has to be grounded consciously in a politics that is committed to 
“fundamental changes in the nature of class, race, and gender” (Haraway 161). And this is 
where Haraway’s cyborg differs fundamentally from the cyborgs of iN2015. As the 
cyborg is our ontology, the cyborg must also discern and deliver the right politics. 
 
3.  Progress report on iN2015  
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 In examining the impact of technology, it has been useful to note how technology 
can be approached–as an exogenous or endogenous factor–as brought up by Youngs. As 
an exogenous factor, technology is viewed as instrumental, that is, as ends and means, or 
a tool and object of policy. As an endogenous factor, the social context becomes 
important, that technology shapes social forces as much as it is shaped by social forces. In 
looking at the iN2015 policy document through Haraway’s cyborg, the thesis so far has 
adopted the endogenous approach with questions of power and inequality as the dominant 
themes being examined. To look at the achievements of iN2015 in terms of its goals and 
objectives, we now review technology as an exogenous factor, that is, as a tool and object 
of policy. What does the progress report of iN2015 look like three years after it has been 
launched?  
 When it comes to generating revenue and jobs, the infocomm industry has seen 
steady growth in the couple of years since iN2015 was launched. In economic value, 
Singapore’s infocomm industry revenue has grown over 10% since 2006, outperforming 
the rest of the economy. It achieved S$45.42 billion in 2006 and reached S$58.1 billion 
by 2008, with export revenues accounting for 61% of total industry revenue. In terms of 
employment, infocomm manpower grew from 119,700 in 2006 to 139,000 in 2008. 
Infocomm usage during these three years has also seen rapid growth, especially with 
mobile phone and broadband subscription. Generous subsidies have been extended to 
needy households to own computers. All these gains could not have been possible if not 
for the massive government funds invested in infrastructure, R&D grants, and business 
tie-ups with global corporations and research institutes. To cite some examples, the new 
fibre-optic broadband infrastructure costs $1 billion; Mediapolis, the digital media hub 
with state-of-the-art studio facilities, costs $1 billion to build in Singapore’s one-north, 
which is a $15 billion 200 hectare, self-contained research hub in Buona Vista promoting 
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a ‘work, live, learn and play’ lifestyle aimed mainly at attracting foreign experts; and the 
new Standard Operating Environment (SOEasy) project to streamline the whole civil 
service using one integrated system costs $1.3 billion. Many more hundreds of millions of 
state funds are also helping infocomm businesses in schemes, such as the recently 
launched Singapore Media Fusion Plan under the Media Development Authority (MDA) 
receiving $230 million funding on top of $500 previously committed to develop 
interactive digital media.  
 The iN2015 strategy to build an infocomm-savvy workforce and globally 
competitive infocomm manpower are being tackled early through the formal educational 
route. Teachers, pupils and students are well connected in highly computerised school 
environments that are well on its way to achieving targets such as the pupil-computer 
ratio of 6.5:1 in primary schools and 4:1 in secondary schools and junior colleges. The 
FutureSchools@Singapore project with its extensive use of ICTs for teacing and learning, 
is being pioneered in five selected schools. Outside of schools, IDA has awarded training 
grants, subsidised training schemes, funded IT tertiary scholarships and internships 
locally and abroad, offered venture capital funds and mentorship programmes for start-
ups, invested heavily in tie-ups with global industry players and research institutions, 
while doling out huge amounts of state funds for R&D. Constant re-skilling, upgrading, 
and retraining have become the mantra of human resource management in Singapore’s 
globalised economy, where productivity has been on the decline and technology 
identified as the panacea.39 In these three years, IDA has certainly forged ahead to make 
infocomm the key resource to build on human capital by “retooling Singaporeans and 
businesses” to compete in the global marketplace (iN2015 34).  
                                                
39 Chin Lian Goh, “Preparing 10 Workers to Do the Job of 12.” Straits Times 1 Aug 2009. 
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 It would, thus, be churlish not to commend IDA for its achievements towards 
meeting its six goals (page 8) since iN2015 was launched in 2006. Jobs and revenue have 
been generated, more and more Singaporeans own computers and are connected, and high 
speed broadband has arrived. In that respect, if iN2015 is viewed as an economic 
blueprint, this all-embracing ICT policy document can be commended for being 
ambitious, comprehensive, and forward-looking. However, the iN2015 report sets out to 
be more than an economic number cruncher. It has painted dreams and sold promises to 
all Singaporeans of a bright, prosperous, exciting future that is only possible if, and only 
if, infocomm is fully embraced, both personally and nationally. Evidently, iN2015 has 
adopted an unquestioning and uncritical view of technology, held with missionary 
fervour, which can only be described as a seduction to the ideology of technology as 
progress. The iN2015 vision, when probed deeper, is found to be led totally by its 
technology roadmap, the ITR5, which is driven more by what is technologically possible 
and desirable, rather than addressing ontological and political dimensions of living today 
with modern ICTs that go beyond consuming technology to enhance comfort levels.  
 The cyborg future in 2015, as we have seen, necessitates a form of technological 
citizenship that obliges citizens to be technologically knowledgeable, but to the extent of 
being mainly media savvy users and consumers of new technology. The thesis has drawn 
on the cyborg metaphor to reveal the tensions that arise when the technological is 
favoured over the organic or what is essentially human, thus affecting bodies, identities 
and social reality. Beneath the gloss of dazzling animations, official ICT plans with fancy 
acronyms, and ‘hip’ corporate videos such as MDA’s Upper Management Rap, more 
analyses are required to get behind the glowing statistics and the hype promoted of new 
technology. While infocomm has created jobs and contributed to national income, the 
evidence also points to infocomm deepening the growing socio-economic disparities. 
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Singapore’s worsening Gini index, dismissed by the highly revered Minister Mentor as 
irrelevant to Singapore’s economic development40, also becomes ignored by policy 
makers as a guide to correct government policies, or as a barometer of social cohesion 
and even of social justice. For those digitally left behind, their citizenship status becomes 
defined by their seclusion from technology that turns into an economic exclusion with its 
high personal costs and social stigma. Aihwa Ong’s reconceptualization of citizenship in 
the ecology of expertise needed for the high tech sectors becomes acutely relevant as 
Singapore implements the iN2105 vision to achieve its macro goals. While examining 
Singapore’s bio-tech sector, Ong finds that the knowledgeable, risk-taking and 
entrepreneurial subjects have been found mainly among foreign professionals (339).  
 Infocomm has been shown to aggravate existing inequalities and to produce new 
strains of inequalities, both globally and locally, but iN2015 takes an opposite position 
and sees it as a powerful leveller in society. Such a position flies in the face of mounting 
evidence confirming Haraway’s informatics of domination. It behooves all to see who the 
marketeers of technotopia are in intelligent nation Singapore. Are they the global kinetic 
elites, the virtual class, and/or the technologically knowledgeable citizens? We return for 
the last time to Haraway’s cyborg for the question about techno politics. 
 
Haraway’s cyborg and techno-politics 
 Almost everyone who has a message to sell an audience today uses new media 
and its social networking tools to create the viral effect in marketing. Governments, 
church groups, NGOs and activists are twittering, blogging, using Facebook, targeting 
                                                
40 At a recent university forum in October 2009, Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew was asked what 
Singapore could do to narrow its income gap. MM Lee, as he is referred to, replied: “Never mind 
your Gini coefficient. If you don’t have a job, you get zero against those with jobs. So our first 
priority is jobs for everybody.” Reported in Jeremy Au Yong, "MM Lee: Social Divide 




especially the young who are expectedly more savvy with these media tools. In 
Singapore, several ministers, for example, Ministers George Yeo and Khaw Boon Wan, 
have also taken to blogging to connect with voters. But in April this year, new media 
communication tools were used to great effect for serious political jockeying in a 
leadership tussle over Singapore’s feminist advocacy group, AWARE. The occasion, 
called the AWARE saga, caught everyone off-guard when women in the thousands, a 
scenario never before experienced in the organisation’s 24-year history, turned up 
voluntarily to vote in a referendum. The incident became a cause célèbre, in Singapore’s 
turgid political scene, dominating local media–traditional and new–every day for weeks. 
The power struggle over AWARE signalled the dangers of mixing politics with religion 
in Singapore. But this incident is quoted here to show the use of new media tools by 
opposing groups in a political tussle for democratic control of an activist NGO. The 
AWARE saga is a good example of the dilemmas of Haraway’s cyborg deployed as a 
strategy for political intervention, and I like to make two observations in relation to the 
question of techno-politics. The first regards the users of the media tools, and the second 
concerns the message of the democratic potential of these tools. 
 If cyborg techno-politics is about “seizing the tools to mark the world that marked 
them as other” recalling Haraway’s adoption of Sandoval’s oppositional consciousness 
(175), who can be a cyborg and who can she/it speak to? Clearly, it is the educated, the 
tech-savvy and most likely middle-class in Singapore, a profile that describes AWARE’s 
members. The use of cyborgian tools reach out and appeal mainly to cyborgs themselves, 
and not generally the digitally (s)lower classes marked by these tools. Web activism is, 
thus, limited to those who have access to and are comfortable users of these tools. New 
media tools, as compared to traditional media like newspapers and television, have been 
celebrated for its democratising potential in allowing a wider circulation of opinions from 
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the ground and opening up new political spaces for civic engagement. While new media 
tools certainly allow for a wider dissemination as well as debate of ideas, the message of 
their democratising potential needs to be weighed up against the reality of effecting 
substantial change on the ground. The Aware saga brought change within the organisation 
re-instating its former feminist principles, but outside its own turf, the incident has not 
changed much of the political status quo that it had hoped to address. While the 
empowerment from using new media tools was indeed euphoric for AWARE supporters, 
the democratic rhetoric in using these tools can slide easily into the uncritical message of 
progress behind new technology. While using these tools empowers the user, their 
political effectiveness as a democratic leveller solving actual problems on the ground 
must also be questioned. It is, thus, worth being reminded that imbibing the 
empowerment message of new technology uncritically in doing politics is no different 
from becoming the iN2015 state cyborg, a rabid consumer of all things technological but 
nothing else ontologically and politically.  
 It is important to note that Haraway has moved from the cyborg to her companion 
species, adding living species, such as ‘man’s best friend’, our domestic animals, as 
kinship for exploring the basis of cooperation and building un-exploitative social 
relations. This shows that while the cyborg has been a very useful tool for analysis, to 
claim its identity exclusively in formulating a responsible techno-politics may be a first 
step, but insufficient on its own to provide the right kind of politics in cyborgian times. 
While Virilio rejects new technology because he fiercely believes these tools have erased 
the political, he is fully engaged in ground politics among the homeless poor in Paris, 
acknowledging their superior dignity in the way they survive. But, ultimately, we would 
still need Haraway’s cyborg for its anti-dualism and techno-politics, Vilirio’s epistemo-
technical questioning and techno-speed criticism, and Youngs’ political economy analysis 
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of inequality, to understand today’s hypermodern techno world seduced by speed, 
constant innovation, and the hyperreal. Without the vigilance afforded and tempered by 
these critical tools, intelligent nation Singapore would be cold and soulless, a place for 
the technologically knowledgeable and powerful manipulating the other classes for their 
own privilege. 
 
4.  Limitations of study and future research 
 A major limitation of the current research is the wide scope of the subject matter 
presented by the iN2015 report and its accompanying Infocomm Technology Roadmap 
report. Both were extensive documents, each running over 150 pages, in addition to 
related materials such as the IDA corporate videos and website. In dissecting the macro 
perspective of the iN2015 vision, it was difficult to focus at the same time on the 
domestication of ICTs and the implementation of infocomm policies directed by iN2015 
in certain industries or sectors. Among the ten sectors spotlighted by the iN2015 for 
infocomm development, I would highlight education and learning, and healthcare and 
biomedical sciences, as essential areas to examine for a further understanding of how the 
cyborg state is perceived, conceived and constructed in the social imaginary of the policy 
drafters and administrators. Another limitation of the thesis is the lack of interviews with 
the policy drafters themselves and the many sub-committee members behind the fuller 
iN2015 document. With a policy document that will have such far-reaching impact for 
Singapore’s future, it is crucial to study the process in which the iN2015 document was 
produced. IDA has always presented the iN2015 as a public, private, and people sector 
co-creation. Examining what this means against actual reality would reveal Singapore’s 
policy making and governance processes. Future research is suggested in areas that have 
been glossed over by the iN2015 report. One is the grossly overlooked gender perspective 
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in ICT planning and its impact on education and the economy. Another is Singapore’s 
military-industrial-scientific-entertainment-media complex, how key players are 
interlinked, with all its consequent socio-political-economic implications. Finally, as 
Singapore gets more wired up and connected under the iN2015 plan, increasing control 
and surveillance will further impinge on personal privacy issues, bearing consequences 
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